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INTRODUCTION 
ne evening in April 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic swept 
through the United States and businesses closed their doors, 
Margarita Lopez received a knock on hers.1 When she opened it, a man 
handed her a note and said “Good luck.”2 She was being evicted from 
her Staten Island apartment; New York’s emergency eviction freeze 
was set to expire, leaving Lopez with little time or recourse.3 Reflecting 
on the experience, Lopez told a reporter, “Every time I walk out of this 
door, I’m scared for my life. I feel like I have no power. . . . I feel stuck. 
If I end up homeless, a shelter is not an option because eventually I’ll 
get sick. It’s a lot of questions about what comes next.”4 
Lopez is not alone. Only one-third of tenants nationwide were able 
to pay rent in April 2020, and only slightly more than half were 
expected to be able to pay their full rent in the following months.5 
Homeowners also fell behind. Roughly 3.4% of Americans were 
delinquent on their mortgage payments as of April 2020, and by July 
2020, 4.1 million homeowners were in forbearance.6 Yet the federal 
policy response to the pandemic included remarkably few direct 
interventions to reduce housing instability and prevent homelessness.7 
This failure to prioritize mitigating housing instability during the initial 
1 Caroline Spivack, ‘I Have No Power’: The New York Renters Who Aren’t Protected 
from Eviction, CURBED NY (June 1, 2020, 6:35 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2020/6/1/2127 
3338/new-york-city-eviction-rent-relief-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/8UMW-M7PD]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. Although the state freeze would later be extended until January 1, 2021, Margarita’s 
case did not meet the narrower criteria to qualify for additional time. 
4 Id. 
5 Paula A. Franzese et al., There’ll Be a Tragic Wave of Evictions Unless Legislators Act 
Soon, NJ.COM (June 26, 2020), https://www.nj.com/opinion/2020/06/therell-be-a-wave 
-of-evictions-unless-legislators-act-soon-opinion.html [https://perma.cc/4MZC-KKQP].
6 Andrew Van Dam, An Indicator That Presaged the Housing Crisis Is Flashing Red
Again, WASH. POST (July 14, 2020, 8:05 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2020/07/14/new-mortgage-delinquencies-hit-record-high/ [https://perma.cc/L64P-BUSL].
7 This Article focuses on housing instability as it affects the public health crisis.
However, note that under international human rights law, the right to adequate housing is a
crucial component of a right to an “adequate standard of living” as conveyed in the UN
Declaration of Human Rights. “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including . . . housing . . . and the
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, . . . or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 25, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) 71. The United States
contributed to and endorsed the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
O 
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stages of the pandemic places millions of Americans at risk of eviction 
or foreclosure, with great consequences for public health.8 
This Article analyzes the pathways by which unmitigated housing 
instability could impede the success of public health strategies during 
the pandemic and provides a historically grounded evaluation of the 
housing policy response. The phrase housing instability is used to 
capture the multiple and often overlapping dimensions of how the 
pandemic may directly or indirectly affect housing tenure and security. 
Although most of the dimensions of housing instability described were 
present prior to the pandemic, their potential impact becomes much 
greater given the economic, social, and public health shocks associated 
with COVID-19.9 
Social distancing, the primary public health tool for controlling a 
pandemic like COVID-19, is likely to increase housing instability. 
Because social distancing requires people to remain home as much as 
possible, it has been accompanied by business closures and a rise in 
unemployment. If unemployed workers are unable to pay their 
mortgage or rent, homelessness will increase, effectively preventing 
people from social distancing. Such effects undermine the public health 
response. 
For these reasons, this Article argues that it is essential for 
lawmakers to address housing instability directly. Yet lawmakers have 
rarely taken the steps needed to effectively mitigate housing instability, 
even when its harms have been more salient. To understand why, this 
8 Alicia Adamczyk, Millions of Americans Could Face Eviction in July—and It Could 
Destabilize Communities for Years to Come, CNBC (Jan. 12, 2021, 9:26 AM), https://www 
.cnbc.com/2020/07/01/nearly-7-million-households-could-face-eviction-without-assistance 
.html [https://perma.cc/CES6-K9NK]. In New Jersey alone, a Stout report prepared for the 
Coalition of Housing Advocates in NJ estimates that 450,000 renters (“approximately 40% 
of all renter households”) will be unable to pay their August rent. STOUT, THE POTENTIAL 
IMPACT OF COVID-19 RELATED EVICTIONS IN NEW JERSEY 7 (July 23, 2020). Furthermore, 
“New Jersey could experience 304,000 eviction filings in the coming four months” once the 
eviction moratoriums are lifted, “an estimated 600% increase from pre-COVID-19 levels.” 
Id. at 4. 
9 Research shows that evictions lead to “homelessness, mental and physical health 
challenges, employment loss, [and] challenges re-renting. . . . These impacts often trigger 
a social safety net response (e.g., use of homeless shelters, Medicaid spending . . . , 
[and] payment of unemployment benefits . . .) that is extremely expensive for states and 
cities. Furthermore, these impacts are likely to be significantly worse when coupled with 
COVID-19. The virus’s community transmission could worsen its already detrimental 
effects, including contributing to an increase in . . . cases, particularly among vulnerable 
populations. If this were to happen, generational poverty in New Jersey, especially for Black 
and Brown renter household[s] would undoubtedly be exacerbated.” STOUT, supra note 8, 
at 28. 
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Article analyzes policies intended to mitigate housing instability during 
the last significant economic crisis, the Great Recession, when housing 
instability was at the forefront. Despite the prominent role housing 
instability played during the Great Recession, lawmakers failed to 
implement policies that reduced such instability effectively.  
Drawing on this analysis, this Article provides a historically 
grounded critique of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. We show that the initial response to the COVID-19 
pandemic has faced many of the same barriers to effectively mitigating 
housing instability as those faced during the Great Recession and, as a 
result, further intervention is necessary. Ultimately, our analysis 
concludes that further people-based and place-based interventions are 
necessary to mitigate housing instability. People-based policies include 
assistance provided directly to individuals, such as cash or rental 
vouchers.10 We argue that people-based interventions are essential 
during the pandemic, but that some forms of assistance may be more 
effective than others. For example, housing payment assistance is 
preferable to indirect forms of relief to homeowners and renters. 
Similarly, grants are preferable to tax expenditures. In contrast, place-
based interventions “target specific communities or locations, often 
with the explicit goal of revitalizing entrenched pockets of poverty.”11 
We argue that place-based interventions will be necessary to address 
ongoing housing instability in the months and years following this 
crisis.  
This Article makes several important contributions to the current 
literature. First, it adds to the growing body of literature on COVID-19 
by providing an account of the barriers to mitigating housing instability 
during periods of crisis and placing the pandemic in context with 
historic policy interventions. Second, this Article contributes to the 
urban and poverty law literatures by using the COVID-19 pandemic as 
a case study to reveal new insights about the relative effectiveness of 
housing laws during pandemic conditions. Third, this Article 
contributes to the tax law literature by describing both the potential and 
the limitations of the tax expenditure approach to promote affordable 
housing during a pandemic. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes data from the 
Eviction Lab to predict that housing instability, as reflected in eviction 
10 Nestor M. Davidson, Essay: Reconciling People and Place in Housing and 
Community Development Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2009). 
11 Id. 
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rates, is likely to rise because of the pandemic. It argues that 
policymakers are most likely to take steps to mitigate rising housing 
instability if they understand the public health risks associated with 
housing instability. Accordingly, it describes the pathways by which 
housing instability threatens to undermine the public health response 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Part II describes the major interventions taken during the Great 
Recession and identifies the barriers to their effective implementation. 
During the Great Recession, the policy response focused on foreclosure 
prevention, primarily through loan modification, and place-based 
interventions to increase the supply of permanent affordable housing. 
These programs generally failed to meet expectations due to multiple 
factors, including resource constraints, the use of incentives rather than 
more direct controls, a focus on long-term place-based strategies at the 
expense of more immediate people-based strategies, slow government 
implementation, a reluctance among regulators to administer the 
programs, and low participation by banks. Direct housing assistance, 
including a homelessness prevention and rapid rehousing program, 
played a much smaller role but was arguably more effective. 
Drawing on the foregoing analysis, Part III examines the initial 
policy response of federal, state, and local governments during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, including the first significant emergency 
legislation, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
(CARES Act). In addition to providing cash assistance to individuals 
and businesses, initial policies have included foreclosure moratoriums 
and eviction freezes that directly mitigate housing risk. However, these 
interventions have failed to eliminate the need for direct housing 
payment assistance and grant-funded place-based interventions. 
For these reasons, Part IV sets forth two significant priorities for 
lawmakers: direct relief to renters and homeowners to mitigate housing 
instability during the pandemic, and place-based interventions to 
mitigate housing instability and geographic inequality after the crisis. 
To this end, we recommend three significant policy interventions: 
(1) rental assistance and mortgage payment assistance programs; (2) a
civil right to counsel in evictions to help ensure the efficacy of eviction
freezes and foreclosure moratoriums; and (3) targeted place-based
interventions to promote affordable housing development. These
recommended interventions, which are designed to mitigate housing
instability, are not only essential to address the continuing threat from
COVID-19 but also to prepare the United States for future pandemics.
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I 
HOUSING INSTABILITY DURING A PANDEMIC 
A. Predicting the Impact of COVID-19 on Housing Instability
Social distancing strategies used to control the COVID-19 pandemic 
created a sudden and widespread wave of business closures, employee 
furloughs, and layoffs.12 Even before precautionary shutdowns were 
instituted in parts of the United States, the country officially entered a 
recession in February 2020.13 By the end of April 2020, the official 
U.S. unemployment rate had risen to 14.7%, easing to 13.3% in 
May.14 This May number was almost certainly an underestimate, as 
state employment agencies struggled to process claims, and many 
unemployed workers had not yet filed for unemployment.15  
Though many states implemented eviction moratoriums to prevent 
unemployment from causing a wave of evictions,16 “[h]ousing 
attorneys say that they’ve seen a flood of [wrongful eviction] cases 
nationwide since the economic collapse precipitated by the spread of 
COVID-19.”17 Such housing instability is likely to increase as 
unemployment persists.18 It is important to note that eviction rates were 
high even before the pandemic and disproportionately affected 
communities of color.19 Just as the COVID-19 virus has had a 
12 Shawn Donnan & Joe Deaux, Layoffs Start Turning from Temporary to Permanent 




13 Jeanna Smialek, The U.S. Entered a Recession in February, N.Y. TIMES (June 
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/business/economy/us-economy-recession 
-2020.html [https://perma.cc/2RVU-B854].
14 Id.
15 Yuki Noguchi, Advice on Filing for Unemployment Benefits: Document Everything
and Be Persistent, NPR (Mar. 26, 2020, 3:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections
/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/03/26/821933358/advice-on-filing-for-unemployment
-benefits-document-everything-and-be-persistent [https://perma.cc/N482-VQ3S].
16 See infra Appendix A.
17 Alana Semuels, Renters Are Being Forced from Their Homes Despite Eviction
Moratoriums Meant to Protect Them, TIME (Apr. 15, 2020, 2:47 PM), https://time.com
/5820634/evictions-coronavirus/[https://perma.cc/WN8Q-YTQ4]; see also Millions Face
Housing Crisis After Federal Moratorium on Evictions Expires, NPR (July 26, 2020,  
7:45 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/26/895480905/millions-face-housing-crisis-after 
-federal-moratorium-on-evictions-expires [https://perma.cc/23QQ-AHUJ].
18 See, e.g., Franzese et al., supra note 5.
19 Zoe Greenberg & Tim Logan, A ‘Tsunami of Evictions’ Threatens to Strike Boston,
BOS. GLOBE (June 28, 2020 12:01 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/06/28/metro
/tsunami-evictions-threatens-strike-boston [https://perma.cc/2F59-F7UV]. Researchers found
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disproportionate effect on this population, communities of color will 
also suffer a disparate impact with respect to housing instability 
comparable to the 2007 housing crisis.20 
The nation’s long-term eviction crisis has garnered substantial 
public attention. Trends before, during, and after recessions can help 
predict how the economic turmoil caused by the COVID-19 pandemic 
may impact housing instability. To this end, Figure 1 analyzes data 
from Eviction Lab21 to show how eviction rates have changed in the 
states of California, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Michigan since 
2000. Designated recession periods, including the 2008–2009 Great 
Recession, are shaded in gray.  
We highlight two key observations. First, eviction rates among these 
states reflect substantial variations due in part to state-level eviction 
laws.22 Though the causes of these variations are beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is worth noting that some states with consistently high 
eviction rates—such as Michigan and Louisiana—experienced steep 
spikes in eviction rates during the early stages of the Great Recession. 
Once the rates had spiked in these states, they remained high for several 
years before declining. This suggests that housing instability may 
persist long after a crisis event like the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Second, in many states, the rate of eviction has continued to rise in 
the years leading up to the pandemic. One explanation is that, in many 
parts of the country, rental housing markets substantially restructured 
after the Great Recession to include new classes of institutionally 
owned single-family rental properties.23 Research shows that eviction 
rates within these institutionally owned single-family rental properties 
that between 2014 and 2016, a disproportionate number of evictions happened in 
communities of color and that the number of Black renters in an area is a better predictor of 
eviction filings than any other factor in Boston. Id. Other groups also likely to be 
disproportionately affected by housing instability include LGBT people (generally more 
likely than non-LGBT people to face housing instability during noncrisis periods, making 
them especially vulnerable during the pandemic). See LGBT People Are More Likely 
than Non-LGBT People to Face Housing Instability, WILLIAMS INST., (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/lgbt-housing-press-release/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PUB7-FFQ6]. 
20 Elora Raymond et al., Race and Uneven Recovery: Neighborhood Home Value 
Trajectories in Atlanta Before and After the Housing Crisis, 31 HOUS. STUD. 3, 14–15 
(2015); see also STOUT, supra note 8, at 27. 
21 About Eviction Lab, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/about/ [https://perma.cc 
/9NGJ-B64X]. 
22 Megan E. Hatch, Statutory Protection for Renters: Classification of State Landlord-
Tenant Policy Approaches, 27 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 98, 113 (2017). 
23 Elora Lee Raymond et al., From Foreclosure to Eviction: Housing Insecurity in 
Corporate-Owned Single-Family Rentals, 20 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 159, 160–61 (2018). 
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may be higher than for other rental properties.24 Large institutional 
landlords are also likely to use evictions—and particularly serial 
filings—against the same tenant as a means to regulate their 
relationship with tenants facing other forms of economic instability.25 
These changes to the rental housing market may make tenants more 
vulnerable during the pandemic than they were prior to the Great 
Recession. 
Figure 1. Residential Eviction Rate by U.S. State (2000–2016). 
A study on evictions in Boston found that market-rate eviction 
filings are nearly twice as common in two- and three-family “properties 
where the landlord does not live in the building as in properties where 
the landlord is an owner-occupant.”26 Furthermore, the study noted 
24 Id. at 179. These trends can be explained in part by different motives for institutional 
investors when compared to other rental property owners. Id. at 179–80. 
25 Dan Immergluck et al., Evictions, Large Owners, and Serial Filings: Findings from 
Atlanta, 35 HOUS. STUD. 903, 920 (2019).  
26 DAVID ROBINSON & JUSTIN STEIL, EVICTIONS IN BOSTON: THE DISPROPORTIONATE 
EFFECTS OF FORCED MOVES ON COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 73 (2020). Fifty-five percent 
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significant racial disparities in the neighborhoods most affected by 
evictions with respect to market-rate housing. “Seventy percent of 
market-rate eviction filings occur in neighborhoods where a majority 
of residents are people of color,” even though these communities 
contain less than half of the city’s market-rate rental housing.27 In fact, 
even after controlling for income, market-rate eviction filings are 
more prevalent in census tracts with a higher proportion of Black 
tenants, suggesting “that housing instability and evictions have a 
disproportionate impact on Boston’s Black residents.”28 This is 
partially due to a history of racial segregation in Boston combined with 
current-day high rental burdens and housing instability.29 This research 
indicates that lifting the moratorium will more directly affect 
communities of color.30 
Our own analysis of cross-sectional eviction data at the county level 
from 201631 shows that, on average, eviction rates tend to increase as 
the proportion of nonwhite county population increases. We split all 
counties in the United States into quintiles based upon the proportion 
of nonwhite population, with the first quintile having the fewest 
nonwhite residents and the fifth quintile having the greatest. The 
eviction filing rate in those counties in the fifth quintile was more than 
four times that of the counties in the first quintile. Likewise, the 
eviction rate in these counties was nearly double.32 
These data suggest that without effectively mitigating housing 
instability caused by COVID-19, eviction rates are likely to rise for a 
sustained period and are likely to disproportionately affect racial 
minorities. This may be particularly true in states with consistently high 
eviction rates and those where institutional landlords have broad 
discretion to evict. The next section argues that the willingness of 
lawmakers to take steps to mitigate housing instability during the 
of “two- and three-family properties in Boston are owner-occupied.” Id. Owners of owner-
occupied buildings “filed for an eviction in one in every 137 units each year between 2014 
and 2016” whereas absentee landlords “filed for an eviction in one in every 105 units.” Id. 
27 Id. at 36. The authors note “that historic patterns of housing discrimination and 
residential segregation that persist today and the related concentration of disadvantage in 
communities of color are reflected in the disproportionate distribution of eviction filings and 
severe housing instability.” Id. at 35. 
28 Id. at 40.  
29 Id. at 49.  
30 Id. at 13–14 (“According to court data, 78 percent of eviction cases in Boston that 
were suspended due to COVID-19 were in communities of color.”). 
31 About Eviction Lab, supra note 21. 
32 Data analysis on file with author. 
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pandemic may depend on whether housing instability is recognized as 
a public health threat. 
B. Policy Response to Housing Instability Varies by Perceived Harm
As this section will explain, the rhetoric and policies during the
Great Recession show that lawmakers take housing instability most 
seriously when it is perceived as creating spillover effects that harm the 
broader public. Housing instability featured prominently as a cause of 
the Great Recession.33 A rapid expansion of the secondary mortgage 
industry during the early 2000s had been fueled by the introduction of 
risky subprime mortgages.34 These subprime mortgages led to a wave 
of defaults and foreclosures in 2006 and 2007 and ultimately triggered 
the collapse of the housing finance industry that precipitated the 
recession.35 The national unemployment rate peaked at 10.0% in 
October 2009,36 and the number of moderately cost-burdened rental 
households “grew to 49%, with 26% of renters severely burdened.”37 
From 2007 to 2010, family homelessness rose by 20%.38 In 2009, 62% 
of shelter residents were racial or ethnic minorities.39 
There is ample literature outlining the effects of housing instability 
on personal and community health. For example, a review of twenty-
five unique studies on foreclosure found that home foreclosure 
adversely affects physical and mental health at the individual level as 
33 Raphael Bostic & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Introduction: Special Issue on Housing Policy 
in the United States, 24 J. HOUS. ECON. 1, 1 (2014). Note that there has been “considerable 
debate as to the causes of the crises,” and contributing factors may have included changes 
in the housing credit industry and government regulation (including affordable housing 
mandates). Id. 
34 Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: Examining How the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails to Resolve the Foreclosure Crisis, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 
561, 564–65 (2008). 
35 Id. at 565. 
36 Evan Cunningham, Great Recession, Great Recovery? Trends from the Current 
Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub 
/mlr/2018/article/great-recession-great-recovery.htm [https://perma.cc/6BLG-SB53].  
37 Edward J. Sullivan & Karin Power, Coming Affordable Housing Challenges for 
Municipalities After the Great Recession, 21 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 297, 
300 (2012). 
38 Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness in America: A Human Rights Crisis, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 
515, 519 (2012). 
39 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE 2009 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 22 (June 18, 2010). Of the minorities, African Americans were the 
most likely to be homeless, representing approximately 39% of the sheltered homeless 
population, “more than 3 times their share of the U.S. population.” Id. at 24. 
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well as the community level.40 “[T]he stress of personally experiencing 
foreclosure was associated with worsened mental health and adverse 
health behaviors, which were in turn linked to poorer health status; at 
the community level, increasing degradation of the neighborhood 
environment had indirect, cross-level adverse effects on health and 
mental health.”41 Research on renters who have been evicted noted 
increased levels of stress, depression, anxiety, or insomnia as well as 
other negative impacts on these tenants’ and their children’s mental and 
physical health.42 For reasons such as these, some advocates described 
the foreclosure crisis as a “humanitarian crisis.”43  
However, the political rhetoric during the Great Recession 
overwhelmingly downplayed the social welfare aspects of housing 
instability. At every stage of the policy response, mitigation strategies 
were aimed toward minimizing economic harm and protecting 
markets.44 There was political “opposition to using federal resources 
to assist distressed homeowners” and “[n]either the Obama 
administration nor the Bush administration made any sustained efforts 
to convince the public that helping distressed homeowners was 
the right or sensible thing to do.”45 Instead, policymakers emphasized 
goals such as “alleviating the ‘spillover effects’ of mortgage 
foreclosure (e.g., the decrease in property values of non-foreclosed 
homes when foreclosures happen nearby)” and the need to stabilize the 
credit market.46  
40 LAUREN A. TAYLOR, HOUSING AND HEALTH: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2 
(June 2018).  
41 Alexander C. Tsai, Home Foreclosure, Health, and Mental Health: A Systematic 
Review of Individual, Aggregate, and Contextual Associations, 10(4) PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2015). 
42 See, e.g., THE SEATTLE WOMEN’S COMM’N & HOUS. JUST. PROJECT OF THE KING 
CNTY. BAR ASS’N, LOSING HOME: THE HUMAN COST OF EVICTION IN SEATTLE (Sept. 
2018); CTR. ON URB. POVERTY & CMTY. DEV., THE CLEVELAND EVICTION STUDY: 
OBSERVATIONS IN EVICTION COURT AND THE STORIES OF PEOPLE FACING EVICTION (Oct. 
2019); Rilwan Babajide et al., Effects of Eviction on Individuals and Communities in 
Middlesex County (May 12, 2016), https://www.pschousing.org/sites/default/files/2016 
_EvictionStudyFinalDraft.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRH4-HRTM]. 
43 Foscarinis, supra note 38, at 519. 
44 See, e.g., Bruce Arthur, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 46 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 585, 596–97 (2009) (describing market stabilization efforts under the Bush 
Administration); Dan Immergluck, Too Little, Too Late, and Too Timid: The Federal 
Response to the Foreclosure Crisis at the Five-Year Mark, 23 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 199, 
200–01 (2013) (describing the reluctance of both the Bush and Obama administrations to 
advance policies to address harms foreclosures caused to distressed homeowners). 
45 Immergluck, supra note 44, at 200–01. 
46 Arthur, supra note 44, at 596. 
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Accordingly, the initial interventions focused on mortgage reform 
and loan counseling to slow the rate of foreclosures but omitted 
housing payment assistance.47 As housing instability increased due to 
job losses, so did the need to assist struggling homeowners and tenants. 
Nevertheless, rental assistance and mortgage payment assistance 
remained an exceedingly small part of subsequent interventions. Again, 
policy justifications emphasized societal costs beyond harm to 
homeowners, including harms to “[(1)] lenders holding mortgages on 
foreclosed properties, [(2)] homeowners living near foreclosed 
properties, and [(3)] local governments.”48  
Thus, this section has shown that lawmakers readily implemented 
policies to mitigate housing instability when it was perceived as a threat 
to industries or the broader public, but they implemented few programs 
to provide direct monetary assistance to struggling homeowners. Keep 
in mind that minority homeowners were particularly affected by this 
housing crisis “and experienced especially high rates of foreclosure, 
independent of their regional location.”49 This history highlights the 
importance of educating policymakers and the public about the public 
health threat that housing instability presents. It also reveals a political 
reality: individual harms to tenants and defaulting homeowners are 
not sufficiently compelling to lawmakers to ensure the rapid 
implementation of housing legislation. For this reason, the next section 
of this Article describes how housing instability may undermine efforts 
to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, ultimately contributing to its 
spread. 
C. Housing Instability as a Public Health Risk During COVID-19
Housing instability threatens to undermine the public health
response to the pandemic by increasing the number of households 
facing acute housing distress and homelessness, ultimately increasing 
the risk of transmission and exposure to COVID-19. As a result, the 
pandemic raises the stakes associated with long-standing housing 
47 See infra Section II.A. 
48 Michael K. Hollar, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Emergency Homeowners’ Loan 
Program, 13 CITYSCAPE 185, 185–86 (2011); see also Paul A. Joice, Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program, 13 CITYSCAPE 135, 136–37 (2011). 
49 Matthew Hall et al., Variations in Housing Foreclosures by Race and Place, 2005–
2012, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2015) (noting the high rates of 
risky mortgages among racial minorities and “explicit targeting of black and brown 
neighborhoods by predatory lenders”). 
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issues such as homelessness, shortages of affordable housing, and the 
relationship between income insecurity and housing instability.  
As housing instability increases, people are more likely to move into 
crowded spaces like shared residences, where the rate of transmission 
is higher. Even prior to the pandemic, millions of housing-insecure 
people lived “doubled up” with family members or friends.50 When 
two or more families share a single-family residence, there is less 
physical space between occupants, making it difficult to practice social 
distancing in the home. People living in doubled-up residences are less 
likely to be able to self-quarantine or isolate if they experience 
symptoms.51 This allows the virus to spread between members of the 
residence, causing even more infections.52  
The public health risk further increases if housing-insecure families 
lose all access to housing and seek refuge in overcrowded and 
underfunded homeless shelters.53 It is important to note that Pacific 
50 State of Homelessness: 2020 Edition, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, 
https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of 
-homelessness-report/ [https://perma.cc/GQB3-J89C] [hereinafter State of Homelessness].
51 What to Do if You Are Sick, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html (Sept. 11, 2020).
52 Philip Bump, Where the Clusters of the Highest Density of Coronavirus Cases — and
Deaths — Are Located, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/2020/04/06/where-clusters-highest-density-coronavirus-cases-deaths-are-located/
[https://perma.cc/G5TL-NA5U]. For example, the largest outbreak in Massachusetts is
in Chelsea, where a largely immigrant community of low-wage workers live in crowded
triple-deckers with numerous people squeezed into a single room. Antibody tests show about
a third of the population has likely been infected. Jose A. Del Real, In an Immigrant
Community Battling Coronavirus, ‘Essential’ Means ‘Vulnerable,’ WASH. POST (May
9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-an-immigrant-community-battling
-coronavirus-essential-means-vulnerable/2020/05/08/c25cdb4e-8e1e-11ea-a9c0-73b93422
d691_story.html [https://perma.cc/LU6S-4QF5]; Ellen Barry, In a Crowded City, Leaders
Struggle to Separate the Sick from the Well, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www
.nytimes.com/2020/04/25/us/coronavirus-chelsea-massachusetts.html; Jonathan Saltzman,
Nearly a Third of 200 Blood Samples Taken in Chelsea Show Exposure to Coronavirus,
BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/04/17/business/nearly
-third-200-blood-samples-taken-chelsea-show-exposure-coronavirus [https://perma.cc
/KYW9-7NRK]. 
53 An additional risk factor is the so-called criminalization of homelessness, resulting 
in some homeless people spending time in jails. Bidish Sarma & Jessica Brand, The 
Criminalization of Homelessness: Explained, APPEAL (June 29, 2018), https://theappeal.org 
/the-criminalization-of-homelessness-an-explainer-aa074d25688d [https://perma.cc/6ZEV 
-TXMT]. Jails have emerged as virus hotspots during the COVID-19 pandemic. Jimmy
Jenkins & Matt Katz, ‘A Ticking Time Bomb’: Advocates Warn COVID-19 Is Spreading
Rapidly Behind Bars, NPR (Apr. 28, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04
/28/846678912/a-ticking-time-bomb-advocates-warn-covid-19-is-spreading-rapidly-behind
-bars; Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in
Correctional & Detention Facilities, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
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Islanders, Native Americans, Black Americans, multiracial Americans, 
and Latinxs “are far more likely to be homeless than the national 
average and white Americans.”54 Inside crowded shelters, people are 
unable to maintain the six feet of social distance recommended by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or practice basic hygiene.55 
People in shelters sleep only a few feet apart and use communal 
bathrooms, creating the perfect conditions for a virus to spread rapidly 
throughout the shelter.56 At least one confirmed outbreak at a homeless 
shelter in San Francisco infected more than seventy residents and 
staff.57  
Other large cities such as New York and Chicago face similar 
challenges dealing with COVID-19 and their homeless populations. 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) estimates 
in 2019 showed that there were about 78,000 people without access to 
consistent housing in New York City, with at least 3,500 people 
without access to emergency or transitional housing.58 These homeless 
people are typically taken to congregate housing where COVID-19 
easily spreads due to close quarters and lack of supplies. By May 2, 
2020, sixty such homeless persons had died, 75% of whom had been 
staying at shelters.59  
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance 
-correctional-detention.html (Feb. 19, 2021).
54 State of Homelessness, supra note 50 (“Overall homelessness has decreased by 12
percent since 2007,” but the COVID-19 crisis will likely wipe out these gains.).
55 Sam Levin, ‘If I Get It, I Die’: Homeless Residents Say Inhumane Shelter Conditions
Will Spread Coronavirus, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2020/mar/19/if-i-get-it-i-die-homeless-residents-say-inhumane-shelter-conditions-will
-spread-coronavirus; see also Lynn Jolicoeur, Coronavirus Testing in Boston’s Homeless
Community Shows Shelter Size and Density Matter, WBUR (May 15, 2020), https://www
.wbur.org/commonhealth/2020/05/15/boston-homeless-coronavirus-testing [https://perma
.cc/9MYC-4JGC] (noting that crowded homeless shelters in Boston had a positive rate of
greater than 30% in randomized universal testing).
56 See Levin, supra note 55. 
57 Liam Dillon & Maura Dolan, 70 Test Positive for Coronavirus at San Francisco 
Homeless Shelter, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020, 3:59 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california 
/story/2020-04-10/70-test-positive-for-coronavirus-at-san-francisco-homeless-shelter. 
58 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HUD 2019 CONTINUUM OF CARE HOMELESS 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HOMELESS POPULATIONS AND SUBPOPULATIONS (Sept. 20, 
2019), https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC_PopSub_CoC_NY-600-2019 
_NY_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q8A-RRG9]. 
59 Nikita Stewart & Nate Schweber, Stark Symbol of Pandemic in N.Y.: Homeless People 
Huddled on the Subway, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02 
/nyregion/coronavirus-nyc-subway-homeless.html [https://perma.cc/T3JS-NHGE]. By July 
6, 2020, at least 100 homeless people had died of COVID-19 and approximately 1,300 had 
tested positive in New York City. Eyewitness News, Coronavirus News: 100 Deaths from 
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If the challenges of preventing outbreaks in homeless shelters result 
in shelter closures, then many homeless people will be forced back onto 
the street.60 Already, some homeless people have voluntarily left 
crowded shelters and set up camp in an effort to avoid catching 
COVID-19.61 As a result, people who may have been exposed to the 
virus in shelters may become prevalent in public spaces—contrary to 
public health recommendations for isolation or self-quarantine—
increasing the risk of exposure to the broader public.62  
Moreover, with many public facilities such as libraries and public 
restrooms closed due to social distancing efforts, the number of safe 
and sanitary restrooms available to homeless people has plummeted 
drastically.63 For example, when New York City closed many of its 
other public spaces, the subways became a refuge for those without 
housing. Demonstrating the public health hazard that ensued, more than 
100 transit workers have died from COVID-1964 while 6,000 became 
sick or were quarantined.65 New York City and State were forced to 
take unprecedented action. As of May 6, 2020, the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority has closed the subways between 1:00 and 
5:00 a.m., allowing for deep cleaning and disinfecting and eliminating 
the overnight shelter that some homeless people had come to rely on.66 
Because failure to mitigate housing instability may undermine 
broader public health goals, we argue that early action to assist the 
growing number of housing-insecure people is essential. To help shed 
light on what interventions may be most effective for mitigating 
COVID-19 Among Homeless in NYC, ABC 7 N.Y. (July 6, 2020), https://abc7ny.com 
/homeless-covid-coronavirus-update-nyc/6303504/ [https://perma.cc/4HFZ-TFFE]. 
60 Mario Koran, Las Vegas Parking Lot Turned into ‘Homeless Shelter’ with Social 
Distancing Markers, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news 
/2020/mar/30/las-vegas-parking-lot-homeless-shelter.  
61 Levin, supra note 55. 
62 Id.  
63 Alex Brown, The Pandemic Has Closed Public Restrooms, and Many Have Nowhere 
to Go, PEW (July 23, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs 
/stateline/2020/07/23/the-pandemic-has-closed-public-restrooms-and-many-have-nowhere 
-to-go [https://perma.cc/9VHU-E7YQ].
64 Stewart & Schweber, supra note 59.
65 Christina Goldbaum, 41 Transit Workers Dead: Crisis Takes Staggering Toll on
Subways, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/nyregion
/coronavirus-nyc-mta-subway.html [https://perma.cc/4KL9-7T9M].
66 Christina Goldbaum, N.Y.C.’s Subway, a 24/7 Mainstay, Will Close for Overnight
Disinfection, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/nyregion
/subway-close-cuomo-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/F5XD-Y6ZZ]. As of May 3, 2020,
NY Penn Station’s Amtrak and NJ Transit concourses will also be closed from 1 a.m. until
5 a.m. for intensive cleaning of the transit hub and trains.
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housing instability, Part II reviews the major interventions taken during 
the Great Recession and identifies barriers to their effective 
implementation. By learning from the past, lawmakers can increase the 
likelihood that new policies implemented during the pandemic will 
effectively mitigate housing instability.  
II 
LEARNING FROM HISTORY: POLICY FAILURES AND THE 
GREAT RECESSION 
This Article argues that unmitigated housing instability has the 
potential to undermine the public health response to COVID-19.67 For 
this reason, an effective policy response during the pandemic must 
include preventative policies that keep owners and renters in their 
homes, as well as a housing safety net that facilitates rapid rehousing 
of people who lose their homes to foreclosure or eviction. Because 
mitigating housing instability was at the center of the policy response 
to the Great Recession, an analysis of interventions during that period 
can help inform current policymaking.  
This part will analyze three categories of interventions used during 
the Great Recession: foreclosure prevention strategies such as the 
FHASecure program, place-based interventions such as the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program, and people-based interventions 
such as the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Rehousing program 
that were implemented during the Great Recession to mitigate housing 
instability. Through this analysis, this part identifies barriers to 
effectively mitigating housing instability, including the overreliance on 
incentives, the prioritization of place-based interventions over people-
based assistance, implementation challenges, and low participation due 
to the voluntary nature of most of the foreclosure programs. We 
conclude this part with three important lessons relevant to the COVID-
19 response: (1) housing payment assistance to individuals may be 
more effective than indirect interventions such as mortgage 
modification incentives directed at lenders, (2) grants may be more 
effective than tax expenditures during crisis periods, and (3) place-
based investment in neighborhoods may be necessary. 
67 See supra Section I.C. 
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A. Foreclosure Prevention During the Great Recession
During the Great Recession, both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations “relied on incentives and subsidies to lenders and 
servicers to modify loans.”68 However, as this section will explain, the 
success of these programs was hindered by slow program rollouts, their 
voluntary nature, low participation by banks, prohibitively restrictive 
eligibility requirements, and a reluctance among regulators to 
administer the programs to their fullest potential. Unless these barriers 
are addressed, similar loan modification programs are unlikely to 
effectively mitigate housing instability during the pandemic.69  
The first significant federal effort to slow foreclosures during the 
Great Recession was the Bush Administration’s FHASecure program, 
which encouraged lenders to modify adjustable-rate mortgages.70 That 
program was followed by two other Bush-era loan modification 
programs, the Hope Now Alliance71 and the Hope For Homeowners 
program.72 All these programs fell short of expectations.  
FHASecure resulted in a mere 4,212 loan modifications (as 
compared to 80,000 predicted modifications).73 Hope Now Alliance 
was “responsible for only approximately 9% of loan modifications in 
the first six months of 2008” and 2% in the second half of the year.74 
The Hope for Homeowners program also “failed to get any traction” 
and only 340 loans were modified under the program in 2010.75 
This number was disappointing, as 400,000 loan modifications were 
anticipated.76 
The Obama Administration’s loan modification programs also failed 
to reach their full potential. These initiatives included the Home 
68 David A. Zalewski, Collective Action Failures and Lenders of Last Resort: Lessons 
from the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis, 46 J. ECON. ISSUES 333, 335 (2012); see also 
CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE HIDDEN 
ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019). 
69 See LINDA E. FISHER & JUDITH FOX, THE FORECLOSURE ECHO: HOW THE HARDEST 
HIT HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY, Chs. 2, 4 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2019). 
70 Zalewski, supra note 68, at 335. 
71 Immergluck, supra note 44, at 204. 
72 Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 
122 Stat. 2654. Note that in August 2007, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
implemented the FHA Secure program to help refinance mortgages into more affordable 
loans. Immergluck, supra note 44, at 204. 
73 Immergluck, supra note 44, at 204. 
74 Id. at 206. 
75 Id. at 204. 
76 Arthur, supra note 44, at 601. 
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Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)77 and the Hardest Hit Fund 
created under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).78 Under 
HAMP, eligible homeowners temporarily received a lower interest rate 
that would become permanent if they did not default.79 Although three 
to four million homeowners were expected to participate, only about 
816,000 homeowners were granted loan modifications during the first 
two years of the program.80  
The Hardest Hit Fund earmarked $7.6 billion in federal grants to 
state housing finance agencies to develop local foreclosure prevention 
strategies.81 However, during the first year of the program, only 3% of 
funds were expended, and only 7% of total projected homeowners were 
assisted.82 Only $478 million of approved funds were spent in the first 
year and a half.83 These statistics reflected the low number of loan 
modifications made during the period. For example, during the first 
year, only three homeowners were approved for debt reduction in 
Arizona even though almost half of the state’s homeowners held 
underwater mortgages.84  
At least two factors contributed to these loan modification programs’ 
failures to reach expectations. First, the federal government was 
reluctant to fully administer these programs. Under the Bush 
Administration, free-market ideologies resulted in the early programs 
being “half-hearted and underfinanced.”85 But the Obama-era 
foreclosure mitigation efforts suffered from a similar lack of will on the 
part of federal regulators and government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs). According to one report on the Hardest Hit Fund, “the two 
largest mortgage guarantors, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, [would] not 
77 Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mha/Pages 
/hamp.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q8MF-JDFY] (Jan. 30, 2017). 
78 Zalewski, supra note 68, at 335–36. 
79 Id. at 336. 
80 Id. Frequently homeowners resorted to the courts in order to secure loan modifications 
under HAMP following lender intransigence. See Plaintiff’s Complaint, Begum v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, No. 1:10-cv-02014 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2010). One of the authors of this 
Article was part of the legal team that filed this case. 
81 Zalewski, supra note 68, at 336. 
82 Blair D. Russell et al., Take-Up of Mortgage Assistance for Distressed Homeowners: 
The Role of Geographic Accessibility, 24 J. HOUS. ECON. 57, 58–59 (2014). 
83 Zalewski, supra note 68, at 336. 
84 Shaila Dewan, Freddie and Fannie Reject Debt Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/business/opposition-from-freddie-and-fannie-stalls 
-debt-reduction.html [https://perma.cc/4CF2-578P].
85 Zalewski, supra note 68, at 338.
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participate” in the program.86 The GSEs and then-Director of the 
Federal Housing Financing Agency Edward J. Demarco had taken the 
position that reducing mortgage principal was “bad for business, and 
as a result bad for taxpayers.”87 This experience suggests that 
significant political challenges stand to limit the effectiveness of loan 
modification programs.  
Second, all these loan modification programs relied on voluntary 
participation by both lenders and homeowners. Lenders were reluctant 
to participate due to “the market structure of mortgages and 
securitization that may complicate renegotiations, lack of incentives 
and authority for servicers to modify loans, and overall servicer 
congestion and lack of capacity to process applications.”88 On the 
borrower-side, voluntary participation was affected by program 
awareness, eligibility criteria, and the extent to which homeowners 
persisted throughout the application processes.89 One researcher found 
that proximity to intake agencies affected take-up rates.90 Another 
noted that some homeowners may have been reluctant to participate 
because the modifications would cost them “half of future appreciation 
and significant pride.”91 
Unless these barriers can be overcome, such incentive-based 
programs may be ineffective to mitigate housing instability, 
particularly in cases of prolonged unemployment caused by an ongoing 
pandemic.92  
B. Place-Based Interventions During and After the Great Recession
Although the policy response during the Great Recession centered
on foreclosure prevention, some efforts were made to increase 
the supply of affordable housing. Two significant place-based 
interventions included in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
86 Dewan, supra note 84. 
87 Id. 
88 Russell et al., supra note 82, at 59. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 65 (noting the “greater distances associated with lower percentages of complete 
applications”). 
91 Arthur, supra note 44, at 599. 
92 Dan Immergluck, The Foreclosure Crisis, Foreclosed Properties, and Federal Policy: 
Some Implications for Housing and Community Development Planning, 75 J. AM. PLAN. 
ASS’N 406, 415 (2009) (“Borrowers suffering from long spells of unemployment are less 
likely to be helped by moderate reductions in mortgage payments.”). 
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2008 (HERA)93 were the expansion of the Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) program94 and the introduction of the Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program (NSP), which provides emergency funding for 
rehabilitation of abandoned and foreclosed homes.95  
Subsequent legislation doubled down on the place-based approach. 
The fiscal stimulus package in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)96 included supplemental grant 
funding to bolster the LIHTC program97 and an appropriation to the 
Public Housing Capital Fund for rehabilitation of vacant rental units.98 
Later, when certain low-income areas failed to recover from the 
recession, lawmakers introduced the Opportunity Zones tax incentive 
to further combat blight in distressed neighborhoods.99 This section 
analyzes the impact of these interventions and argues that place-based 
interventions were insufficient to mitigate the spike of housing 
instability in the short term.  
1. LIHTC Expansion and Supplemental Grants
HERA made several statutory changes to the LIHTC program,
including increasing the size of the program,100 expanding the 9% 
93 Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
Stat. 2654. 
94 HERA §§ 3001-05. The LIHTC provides for a tax credit equal to the “applicable 
percentage” of the qualified basis of each qualified low-income building. I.R.C. § 42 (2008). 
The tax credit functions as a supply-side subsidy for affordable housing and is the largest 
federal subsidy for affordable housing production. Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy 
in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 878 (1993). 
95 HERA § 2301; Immergluck, supra note 44, at 199. For a detailed discussion of all 
housing-related changes included in HERA, see generally Michael J. Novogradac & Glenn 
A. Graff, Impact of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 on Current and Future
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Properties, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L.
47 (2008).
96 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115. 
97 ARRA Title XII (Home Investment Partnerships Program). 
98 ARRA Title XII (Public Housing Capital Fund). 
99 I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (as included by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 
Stat. 2054 (2017)). 
100 HERA temporarily increased the per capita allocation of LIHTCs for each state for 
2008 and 2009. HERA § 3001. The law “increased the per capita allocation by 10% for 
2008—from $2.00 to $2.20—which resulted in a per capita allocation of $2.30 in 2009 after 
adjusting for inflation.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (GAO), GAO-13-66, LOW-
INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AGENCIES IMPLEMENTED CHANGES ENACTED IN 2008, 
BUT PROJECT DATA COLLECTION COULD BE IMPROVED 9 (2012). The ceiling was also 
increased for 2019, 2020, and 2021. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-141, § 102(a), 132 Stat. 540-41 (2018).
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credit,101 adding a discretionary “basis boost” to provide a larger tax 
credit for select projects,102 and expanding acquisition and 
rehabilitation credits.103 Despite these changes, investor appetite 
declined the following year.  
A significant barrier to the effective mitigation of housing instability 
through tax expenditures is the fact that tax relief is not as attractive to 
investors during recessions as it is during periods of growth. In a 
growing economy, financial institutions readily invest in LIHTC 
projects to reduce their income tax burden.104 However, the Great 
Recession “reduced the profitability of banks and other financial 
institutions that were large LIHTC investors.”105 With less tax liability 
to offset, these investors no longer needed nonrefundable tax credits, 
and demand for the newly expanded tax credits decreased.106  
To address this problem, ARRA authorized the Tax Credit 
Assistance Program (TCAP) to provide supplemental grants for LIHTC 
101 HERA § 3002. The applicable percentage is the yield over a ten-year period. It is 
common to refer to “4% credits” (used for rehabilitation projects or tax credits automatically 
awarded for projects financed with tax-exempt bonds) and “9% credits” (competitively 
allocated tax credits for new construction projects). Historically, the “9% credit” floated 
between 7.35% and 9.27%. CONG. RSCH. SERV., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT (Feb. 27, 2019). HERA established a 9% floor for the applicable rate 
for the competitive 9% tax credits. Without this change, the applicable rate would have been 
7.94% in August 2008. GAO, supra note 100, at 9. Initially applicable only to projects 
placed in service prior to 2013, the change was made permanent in 2016. Consolidated 
Appropriation Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015) (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 42(b)(2)). HERA also expanded the number of projects eligible for the 9% credit 
by narrowing the definition of ineligible federally subsidized projects. HERA § 3002(b) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 42(i)(2)(A)). Prior to the change, “if any part of a building’s 
eligible basis was federally subsidized, the building was ineligible for the 9 percent credit.” 
GAO, supra note 100, at 9.  
102 HERA provided for a discretionary basis boost whereby state housing authorities 
could treat individual projects “as if” they were in difficult development areas. HERA 
§ 3003(a). This gives housing finance authorities “the ability to designate any building,
regardless of location, as eligible for an enhanced credit of up to 130 percent of the
building’s eligible basis” (rather than 100 percent). GAO, supra note 100, at 9; I.R.C.
§ 42(d)(5)(B)(v). Some states have used this flexibility to locate LIHTC projects in higher
opportunity neighborhoods, while others have not undertaken such efforts. See Blaine G.
Saito, Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 39 VA. TAX 
REV. 451, 487–88 (2020).
103 HERA relaxed the 10-year waiting period for rehabilitation of existing buildings. 
HERA § 3003(f) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 42(d)(6)). Prior to the change, “the 
acquisition cost of an existing building would not be eligible for the credit unless there was 
a period of at least 10 years between the date” acquired and placed in service. GAO, supra 
note 100, at 9.  
104 GAO, supra note 100, at 10. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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projects.107 A related program, the Tax Credit Exchange Program, 
allowed state housing finance agencies to exchange portions of their 
housing credit ceiling for cash grants to finance low-income 
housing.108 Data limitations make it difficult to fully assess the impact 
of these interventions. Our analysis of LIHTC project allocations 
from 2008 to 2011 reflects 208 projects financed with the TCAP 
subsidy.109 Over half of the TCAP allocations were made in 2009, 
when 131 projects (approximately 9% of projects) were supplemented 
by the grants.110 This suggests that, at minimum, the program was 
implemented quickly.  
Nevertheless, HUD records suggest that the number of LIHTC 
subsidized projects placed in service declined sharply during the period 
from 2008 to 2010.111 Although the Government Accountability Office 
found that the interventions “likely prevented even further decreases in 
LIHTC projects after 2008, particularly in rural areas,”112 the declines 
suggest that the interventions were insufficient to fully overcome the 
market forces that chill LIHTC investment during recession periods.  
2. Rehabilitation Subsidies
a. Interventions During the Great Recession
In addition to increasing the need for affordable housing, the waves
of foreclosures during the Great Recession increased the number of 
foreclosed properties in many metropolitan areas.113 As a result, a 
major policy question during and after the crisis was how to deal with 
107 CONGR. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS 8 (2015), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016 
/reports/50782-lowincomehousing.pdf [https://perma.cc/75Y7-9S8T]. Note that ARRA 
included a total of $17.2 billion for housing assistance programs. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office, “[m]ore than one-third of that amount went to projects that 
had received assistance from the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Public housing 
improvements accounted for about one-quarter of that spending, as did the combination of 
community development programs and assistance to the homeless. The rest went to owners 
of project-based rental assistance (PBRA) properties.” Id. at 8; see also GAO, supra note 
100, at 11; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
Title XII, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
108 GAO, supra note 100, at 11. 
109 Nat’l Low Income Hous. Tax Credit (LIHTC) Database, HUD USER, https://lihtc 
.huduser.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ZM63-DW3F]. Data analysis on file with author. 
110 Id. 
111 GAO, supra note 100, at 22. Drawing on HUD data, the GAO reported that 1,225 
projects were placed in service in 2007; 1,286 in 2008; 886 in 2009; and 594 in 2010. Id. 
112 Id. at 24. 
113 Immergluck, supra note 92, at 409. 
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vacant properties. While “[a]ddressing problems associated with 
neighborhood blight are typically the responsibility of local 
government agencies . . . the scale of the housing crisis exceeded the 
resources of many local governments.”114  
The primary federal intervention was the NSP introduced by 
HERA.115 The program, implemented in the fall of 2008, provided 
$3.92 billion in emergency funding to state and local governments for 
rehabilitation of abandoned and foreclosed homes.116 Another $2 
billion was subsequently appropriated under the ARRA,117 and a final 
round of $1 billion in funding was included in the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).118  
The purpose of the NSP was to “mitigate the impact of foreclosures 
on neighborhoods by reducing the stock of distressed properties, 
removing visual blight and sites of crime, and signaling to residents 
that the neighborhood was capable of improvement.”119 Local 
governments and nonprofits were tasked with using the funds for five 
approved activities: “rehabilitation or redevelopment of foreclosed and 
vacant properties, demolition of blighted structures, land banking, and 
stand-alone financing for purchase or development of affordable 
housing.”120 The majority of NSP funds were allocated to state and 
local government entities and local nonprofits, though “several national 
organizations, including Habitat for Humanity, also received funds.”121 
The outcomes of the NSP program are uncertain. Some early 
observers expressed optimism that the program would encourage 
investment in rental housing,122 noting that “[o]ne known outcome is 
that many NSP awardees have purchased properties to ‘land bank’ 
them for future affordable housing development.”123 Other studies 
114 Jenny Schuetz et al., Have Distressed Neighborhoods Recovered? Evidence from the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program, 34 J. HOUS. ECON. 30, 30 (2016). 
115 Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2301, 
122 Stat. 2654 (2008).  
116 Immergluck, supra note 44, at 219. 
117 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title 
XII, 123 Stat. 115 (Community Development Fund). 
118 Immergluck, supra note 44, at 210. 
119 Schuetz et al., supra note 114, at 30–31. 
120 Id. at 31. 
121 James C. Fraser & Deirdre Oakley, The Neighborhood Stabilization Program: Stable 
for Whom?, 37 J. URB. AFF. 38, 39 (2015). 
122 See generally Laura Schwarz, The Neighborhood Stabilization Program: Land 
Banking and Rental Housing as Opportunities for Innovation, 19 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & 
CMTY. DEV. L. 51 (2009). 
123 Fraser & Oakley, supra note 121, at 38. 
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predicted that NSP investment would have a “multiplier effect” 
whereby private market investors choose to invest in areas that have 
received NSP subsidies.124 Still others noted the long-term benefits that 
might arise from the organizational and coalition capacities put in 
place.125 Meanwhile, one community and economic development 
attorney provided an anecdotal account of a nonprofit using NSP funds 
to combat blight in a low-income Miami neighborhood without social 
displacement.126 
On the other hand, an early report by researchers at Enterprise 
Community Partners noted that less than half of the funds were being 
used to develop affordable rental housing.127 Later studies reported 
mixed impacts on neighborhoods, with some targeted census tracts 
exhibiting statistically significant reductions in distressed properties 
compared to nontargeted tracts but others noting no significant 
differences.128 One researcher speculated that the lack of consistent 
results might be due to “the small scale of [NSP] activity in most 
targeted areas.”129 Others have pointed to administrative complexity 
and the short time frame as barriers to participation.130 
b. Interventions After the Great Recession
Significantly, the spatially uneven recovery from the Great
Recession—the effects of which are still visible in many low-income 
neighborhoods—was an important impetus for the enactment of 
Opportunity Zone (OZ) legislation.131 This tax incentive, created by 
124 Id. (citing Carolina Reid, The Neighborhood Stabilization Program: Strategically 
Targeting Public Investments, 23 COMM. INV. 23 (2011)). 
125 Fraser & Oakley, supra note 121, at 38. 
126 Shahrzad Emami, Combatting Gentrification Through Community-Based 
Lawyering, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 231, 236–40 (2016). 
127 DVORA LOVINGER & AMANDA SHELDON, ENTER. CMTY. PARTNERS, CHANGES 
AND UPDATES TO NSP IN THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 1, 22 
(2009). 
128 Schuetz et al., supra note 114, at 31. 
129 Id. at 45. 
130 Fraser & Oakley, supra note 121, at 39. 
131 Siri Bulusu, How a Tax Perk Can Turn a Paper Mill into a Fish Farm (Podcast), 
BLOOMBERG TAX (May 10, 2019, 1:45 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax 
-report/how-a-tax-perk-can-turn-a-paper-mill-into-a-fish-farm-podcast [https://perma.cc
/V453-PWDL]. Noticeably, however, opportunity zones do little to address the racial wealth
gap. For instance, Latinx and African Americans have one-tenth the net worth of white
Americans. RAY BOSHARA ET AL., THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF WEALTH: HOW AGE,
EDUCATION AND RACE SEPARATE THRIVERS FROM STRUGGLERS IN TODAY’S ECONOMY 7
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Center for Household Financial Stability) (2015). The
implementation of opportunity zones offers scant evidence that it will increase wealth for
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the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017,132 was not part of the 
emergency response to the Great Recession. However, its subsequent 
enactment constitutes an important legal development after the 
recession that merits discussion due to its prominent position among 
existing place-based incentives.  
The Opportunity Zone tool is the latest place-based tax incentive to 
encourage investments in distressed neighborhoods.133 Specifically, 
the law provides for favorable tax treatment of capital gains that are 
reinvested into qualified opportunity funds (QOFs).134 A QOF is a 
corporation or partnership formed to invest in qualified Opportunity 
Zone property.135 The Treasury Department designated Qualified 
Opportunity Zones that were first nominated by the respective 
States, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia.136 For example, 
each governor was allowed to nominate a number of census tracts 
within their state not exceeding 25% of the number of low-income 
those who live in areas where investment is to occur, many of whom are Latinx and African 
American. Brett Theodos et al., An Early Assessment of Opportunity Zones for Equitable 
Development Projects: Nine Observations on the Use of the Incentive to Date, URB. INST. 
(June 2020), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment 
-of-ozs-for-equitable-development-projects_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T6X-LK7R].
132 Amendment of 1986 Code, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
133 Many studies unfortunately show that place-based tax policies have not had a
measurable impact on alleviating poverty. Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification
Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives and a Path Toward Community Oriented
Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 766 (2019).
134 See generally I.R.C. § 1400Z–2. Specifically, a taxpayer who realizes a gain from a
sale of property and reinvests that gain in a QOF within a designated timeframe may defer
recognition of the gain. I.R.C. § 1400Z–2(a)(1), (b)(1). See also IRS Notice 2020-39, Relief
for Qualified Opportunity Funds and Investors Affected by Ongoing Coronavirus Disease
2019 Pandemic (June 4, 2020) and IRS Notice 2021-10, Extension of Relief for Qualified
Opportunity Funds and Investors Affected by Ongoing Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic
(Jan. 19, 2021). Furthermore, if a taxpayer holds the QOF investment for at least 10 years,
the taxpayer may increase the basis to the fair market value at the date of sale. I.R.C.
§ 1400Z–2(c). If at least 5 years, the taxpayer increases the basis by an amount equaling
10% of the amount of gain deferred. I.R.C. § 1400Z–2(b)(2)(B)(iii). If at least 7 years, the
taxpayer further increases the basis by an amount equaling 5% of the amount of gain
deferred. I.R.C. § 1400Z–2(b)(2)(B)(iv). In effect, the taxpayer gets to both defer payment
of taxes on the taxpayer’s initial capital gains and to eliminate the capital gains taxes on the
QOF investment. I.R.C. § 1400Z–2(c).
135 I.R.C. § 1400Z–2(d)(1). Specifically, the fund must hold at least 90% of its assets in 
such property. Id. See IRS Notice 2020-39 for a temporary relaxation of this rule. IRS Notice 
2020-39, supra note 134. Opportunity zone property can be QOZ stock, QOZ business 
property, or a QOZ partnership interest. I.R.C. § 1400Z–2(d)(2)(A).  
136 I.R.C. § 1400Z–1(b)(2)(C). 
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communities137 within their state.138 A census tract that was not a low-
income community could still qualify if the tract bordered a designated 
low-income opportunity zone and the median family income did not 
exceed 125% of that of the bordering, low-income community.139 
There are currently 8,764 designated opportunity zones throughout the 
United States and its territories.140  
According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as of 
September 2019, there were at least 235 self-reported QOFs that 
collectively hold an estimated $62 billion to $72 billion.141 However, 
as the TCJA did not include any reporting requirements for QOFs, we 
are reliant on various organizations that are collecting data, and this 
information varies widely. Novogradac estimated that there were $10 
137 Low-income communities are defined as such based on poverty rates and median 
family income, as per I.R.C § 45D(e), the New Markets Tax Credit program. See THE 
PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES, JOINT ECON. COMM. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.jec 
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2018/11/the-promise-of-opportunity-zones#_edn1 
[https://perma.cc/R3NR-ZKWZ]. 
138 I.R.C. § 1400Z–1(d). In New Jersey, tracts were chosen based on a formula using the 
Municipal Revitalization Index, which reflected economic indicators such as income, 
unemployment rate, and property values; access to transit; and the value of existing 
investments. State of N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, Opportunity Zones, https://www.state.nj 
.us/dca/divisions/lps/opp_zones.html [https://perma.cc/R442-YHAE]. Guidance provided 
by the House Committee Report suggested considering tracts “that: (1) are currently the 
focus of . . . private economic development initiatives . . . (2) have demonstrated success in 
geographically targeted development programs . . . and (3) have recently experienced 
significant layoffs . . . .” Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, at 538–39 (2017). 
139 I.R.C. § 1400Z–1(e)(1). Two hundred thirty were contiguous tracts representing 
2.6% of all designated tracts. BRETT THEODOS ET AL., DID STATES MAXIMIZE THEIR 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE SELECTIONS? ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNITY ZONE DESIGNATIONS, 
URB. INST 2 (revised July 2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication 
/98445/did_states_maximize_their_opportunity_zone_selections_7.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/547F-HQXF]. 
140 See IRS Notice 2018-48, Designated Qualified Opportunity Zones Under Internal 
Revenue Code § 1400Z-2 (Jul. 9, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-18-48.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TNW3-KYWD]. The OZs range from 14 in the Virgin Islands to 879 
in California, with 514 OZs in New York and 169 in New Jersey. OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
DATABASE, OPPORTUNITY ZONES BY LOCATION, https://opportunitydb.com/location/ 
[https://perma.cc/88T5-ZRF6]. The median family income in an OZ is 37% below the State 
median. More than 20% of OZs have a poverty rate higher than 40%, compared to just 
5% of census tracts nationwide. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR  
THE WHITE HOUSE OPPORTUNITY AND REVITALIZATION COUNCIL 4 (2019), https://www 
.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/WHORC-Implementation-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/AE69-VMD6] [hereinafter HUD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]. 
141 FDIC, OPPORTUNITY ZONES: COMMUNITY BANKS, MINORITY DEPOSITORY INSTI-
TUTIONS, AND CDFI BANKS (DRAFT) 3 (2019), https://www.fdic.gov/communitybanking 
/2019/2019-10-10-opzones-mdi.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XBW-3PRA]. The investment focus 
of these QOFs covers 48 states, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico with 30% (71) reporting 
a national focus. Id. 
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billion in funds raised by 406 QOFs reporting equity by April 2020.142 
The Opportunity Zones Database (OpportunityDB) reported 133 QOFs 
with an investment capacity of $43.2 billion as of May 2020.143 In 
March 2020, the National Council of State Housing Agencies 
(NCSHA) reported 210 QOFs with a total anticipated investment of 
$47.6 billion and noted that 63% of these funds target investment in 
affordable housing and community development.144  
However, concerns remain about who the program ultimately 
benefits.145 Economist Paul Krugman has criticized the Opportunity 
Zone “tax break” as a way for Republicans to “bribe private investors” 
to spend on infrastructure rather than do so themselves.146 Other 
news articles reported that the law was driving billions of investment 
profits into projects such as high-end apartment buildings, hotels, 
student housing, and storage facilities.147 For opportunity zones to 
help distressed communities, there must be an affirmative effort for 
142 OPPORTUNITY FUNDS LIST, NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/resource 
-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/opportunity-funds-listing [https://perma.cc 
/KM5U-6NVR] (Apr. 30, 2020). 
143 OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE, QUALIFIED OPPORTUNITY ZONE FUNDS, https:// 
opportunitydb.com/funds/ [https://perma.cc/UTK4-8RHT]. 
144 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, OPPORTUNITY ZONE FUND 
DIRECTORY, https://www.ncsha.org/resource/opportunity-zone-fund-directory/ [https:// 
perma.cc/FTP2-HEKT] (May 5, 2020). 
145 Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 4 (2020) 
(citing Alex Nitkin, Origin Opportunity Fund Raises $105M in 17 Hours, Citing “Insane 
Amount of Demand,” REAL DEAL (Nov. 20, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://therealdeal.com 
/chicago/2018/11/20/origin-opportunity-fund-raises-105m-in-17-hours-citing-insane 
-amount-of-demand/ [https://perma.cc/X4KP-288F]).
146 Paul Krugman, The Great Tax Break Heist, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/opinion/trump-tax-opportunity-zones.html [https://perma.cc
/53F2-ZNGQ]. The OZ tax incentive benefits wealthy individuals given that the top 1% of
households have 69% of all reported capital gains. CAPITAL GAINS GO OVERWHELMINGLY 
TO WEALTHY FAMILIES, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://
www.cbpp.org/capital-gains-go-overwhelmingly-to-wealthy-families [https://perma.cc
/KB8N-29Z5].
147 Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities
Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html [https://perma.cc/ZH6K-RT5V] (noting
that OZ investors minimize risk by investing in high-end assets with little benefit going to
the community); see, e.g., Mark A. Pinsky & Keith Mestrich, Opportunity Zones Are All
Sizzle, Fizzle and the Abuse of Good Intentions, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 22, 2019, 4:20 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/opportunity-zones-are-all-sizzle-fizzle-and-the-abuse
-of-good-intentions-2019-10-08 [https://perma.cc/4UYE-KY4P] (“The results to date show
that the outcomes are more likely to be luxury apartments and sparse jobs, not affordable
housing and employment opportunities.”).
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investments to reflect the needs of the residents within those 
communities.148  
Current barriers to using QOFs for affordable housing include the 
law’s emphasis on increasing property value to receive capital gains 
tax relief,149 a requirement that developers double the basis of 
rehabilitated property,150 the absence of any requirement that QOFs 
adopt a social mission,151 and barriers to engaging nonprofits in 
Opportunity Zone transactions.152 Despite these barriers, the NCSHA 
has featured three case studies on their website of Opportunity Zone 
investments that are developing affordable homes for very-low- to 
moderate-income households and further community revitalization 
efforts.153  
The first example, the Tappan, is a mixed-use, mixed-income 
building in Cleveland with ninety-five apartments, including fifty- 
nine apartments affordable to households earning between 80% and 
120% of Area Median Income (AMI), and a ground-floor bakery.154 
The Tappan is financed with a combination of Opportunity Zone equity 
from local investors and debt and Opportunity Zone equity from  
PNC Bank, as well as a loan and tax incentives from the City of 
Cleveland.155 
The second example, the Ox Fibre Apartments, is a historic 
paintbrush factory in Frederick, Maryland, that was repurposed into 
eighty-three affordable apartments for families earning between 40% 
and 60% of AMI (Ox Fibre Apartments rent as much as $500 less than 
148 Michelle D. Layser, How Place-Based Tax Incentives Can Reduce Geographic 
Inequality, 73 TAX L. REV. 55, 59 (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract 
=3516469 [https://perma.cc/TQ9A-P7WR]. 
149 De Barbieri, supra note 145, at 45. 
150 Letter from Daryl J. Carter, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Avanath 
Capital Management, LLC, to Ms. Jennifer DeCaspers, Chief of Staff of the Internal 
Revenue Service (June 6, 2019) (on file with author). 
151 De Barbieri, supra note 145, at 32 (explaining the self-certification process). 
152 Layser, supra note 148, at 62–63. 
153 Press Release, Economic Innovation Group (EIG), Opportunity Zone Investments 
Create Affordable Homes, Support Community Revitalization (Nov. 20, 2019), https: 
//eig.org/news/opportunity-zone-investments-create-affordable-homes-support-community 
-revitalization-2 [https://perma.cc/9V7M-WKMX] (“These encouraging developments
illustrate some of the ways Opportunity Zones are attracting investment in affordable
housing and community revitalization.”).
154 NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HOUS. AGENCIES, OPPORTUNITY ZONE DEVELOPMENT 
PROFILE: THE TAPPAN, https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uploads/Case-Study-The-Tappan 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/924F-QGPW]. Tappan was developed by Sustainable Community 
Associates. 
155 Id. 
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market rates in the area).156 The financing includes 4% LIHTCs from 
the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, 
federal historic credits, Opportunity Zone equity, tax-exempt 
permanent financing from Freddie Mac, and additional debt from state 
and local sources.157  
The last example, Parramore Oaks, is an energy-efficient building in 
Orlando with twenty-four market-rate apartments and ninety-six 
apartments affordable to families earning between 40% and 60% of 
AMI, including people with special needs or transitioning from 
homelessness.158 It was one of the first developments to combine the 
Opportunity Zone tax incentive with 9% LIHTCs, allocated by the 
Florida Housing Finance Corporation.159 
Moreover, the White House Opportunity and Revitalization Council 
established during the Trump Administration featured affordable 
housing collaborations in some of its road shows.160 For example, 
HUD hosted an Opportunity Zones convening in Trenton to provide 
information and resources for municipalities and local stakeholders to 
attract investments in their cities.161 New Jersey HMFA Executive 
Director Richman noted how LIHTCs “are fundamental to expanding 
affordable housing.”162 New Jersey revised its guidelines for awarding 
156 NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HOUS. AGENCIES, OPPORTUNITY ZONES DEVELOPMENT 
PROFILE: OX FIBRE APARTMENTS, https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uploads/Case-Study 
-Ox-Fibre.pdf [https://perma.cc/X97D-XJTL].
157 Id.
158 NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HOUS. AGENCIES, OPPORTUNITY ZONES DEVELOPMENT 
PROFILE: PARRAMORE OAKS, https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uploads/Case-Study
-Parramore.pdf [https://perma.cc/94YU-WA9Q]. Developed in partnership with Alliant
affiliate Invictus Development, SunTrust Community Capital provided the equity
investment as well as a construction loan and permanent financing. The Orlando Community
Redevelopment Agency contributed additional debt.
159 Id. 
160 Exec. Order No. 13,853, 83 C.F.R. § 65071 (2018), Establishing the White House 
Opportunity and Revitalization Council. On December 12, 2018, President Trump 
established this Council to further the Administration’s plan to coordinate federal resources 
to be used in opportunity zones. 
161 HUD Regional Administrator Lynne Patton Convenes in Trenton to Maximize 
Investments in New Jersey Opportunity Zones, HUD (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.hud.gov 
/states/new_jersey/stories/2020-03-04 [https://perma.cc/VQG7-C3X3] (Lynne Patton, 
HUD Regional Administrator for NY and NJ noting “[a]t HUD, we are passionate about 
this initiative, because we know that Opportunity Zones will elevate distressed 
neighborhoods by encouraging new business development and creating substantial job 
opportunities”). 
162 HUD Regional Administrator Lynne Patton Convenes in Trenton to Maximize 
Investments in New Jersey Opportunity Zones, INSIDER NJ (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www 
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LIHTCs and now awards points for projects located within opportunity 
zones.163 Because the NCSHA case studies demonstrated that 
affordable housing projects need to leverage multiple incentives, the 
interaction between the LIHTC program and the Opportunity Zone tool 
should be carefully examined. 
C. People-Based Interventions During the Great Recession
Housing payment assistance to mitigate housing instability was  
rare during the Great Recession. Few interventions were directed to 
homeowners themselves, let alone renters. However, two people- 
based interventions were notable. First, under ARRA, funds were 
appropriated to HUD for homelessness prevention and rapid rehousing, 
including short- and middle-term rental assistance for tenants.164 
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Emergency Homeowners’ 
Loan Program to provide mortgage payment relief to certain eligible 
homeowners.165 This section analyzes these interventions and argues 
that targeted programs to prevent homelessness were generally 
successful; however, general mortgage payment assistance programs 
faced many of the same barriers to effectiveness as other foreclosure 
prevention interventions. 
1. Rental Assistance
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act created the
Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing (HPRR) program in 
2009.166 Under the law, $1.5 billion was earmarked for housing search 
assistance, temporary rental assistance, and funds to cover security 
deposits and other one-time or short-term costs associated with 
securing housing.167 These funds were to be used for financial 
assistance (e.g., short- and medium-term rental assistance, security and 
utility deposits, utility payments, moving cost assistance, motel and 
.insidernj.com/press-release/hud-regional-administrator-lynne-patton-convenes-trenton 
-maximize-investments-new-jersey-opportunity-zones/ [https://perma.cc/7AR3-FMSH].
163 New Jersey Low Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, Sections
5:80-33.15 (a)(14)(i), https://nj.gov/dca/hmfa/media/download/tax/qap/tc_qap_proposed
_2019_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXC4-ACA7].
164 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title
XII, 123 Stat. 115 (Homelessness Prevention Fund).
165 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1496, 124 Stat. 1376, 2207–09 (2010).
166 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title
XII, 123 Stat. 115 (Homelessness Prevention Fund). 
167 Id. 
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hotel vouchers); housing relocation and stabilization services (e.g., 
case management, outreach, housing search and placement, legal 
services, credit repair); data collection and evaluation; and 
administrative costs.168 The program ran for three years and was 
discontinued in September 2012.169 
Compared to the other interventions discussed in this part, the HPRR 
program was relatively successful. According to HUD, almost 700,000 
people were served in the first year, and nearly all “were subsequently 
able to obtain or maintain permanent housing.”170 Because few states 
had significant homelessness prevention programs in place prior to 
HPRR, some economists concluded that the federal subsidy probably 
did not substitute for states’ existing funds.171 Meanwhile, one 
researcher found “a significant decrease in the probability of being 
homeless in school districts that were more likely to have received 
[HPRR] funds” and that having the program either “in the county, or 
closer to the school district where families live, on average reduces the 
number of homeless students by five to seven percent.”172  
These findings suggest that targeted interventions to prevent 
homelessness through housing payment assistance and supplemental 
programs may be more effective than indirect strategies (e.g., loan 
modification programs) to mitigate housing instability during a crisis.  
2. Mortgage Payment Relief
The $1 billion Emergency Homeowners’ Loan Program (EHLP)
was created under the Dodd-Frank Act.173 The EHLP provided “a zero 
interest, forgivable bridge loan to homeowners who have experienced 
168 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION AND RAPID RE-
HOUSING PROGRAM (HPRP): YEAR 3 & FINAL PROGRAM SUMMARY (2016). 
169 Brendan O’Flaherty, Homelessness Research: A Guide for Economists (and 
Friends), 44 J. HOUS. ECON. 1, 12 (2019). 
170 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE 2010 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT 
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2010), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2010 
HomelessAssessmentReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H558-BDZT]. 
171 O’Flaherty, supra note 169, at 12. 
172 Gabriel Piña Blanco, Federal Policies and the Poor: Allocation Decisions and 
Impacts of Housing Financial Assistance Programs 6 (Jan. 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University) (ProQuest Number 10743655); see also Gabriel Piña & 
Maureen Pirog, The Impact of Homeless Prevention on Residential Instability: Evidence 
From the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program, 29 HOUS. POL’Y 
DEBATE 501, 511 (2019). 
173 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HUD ARCHIVES: EMERGENCY HOMEOWNERS’ 
LOAN PROGRAM (EHLP), https://archives.hud.gov/initiatives/ehlp/index.cfm [https://perma 
.cc/RW4M-CDMA]. 
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a substantial loss of income (a reduction of at least 15%) due to 
unemployment or underemployment caused by adverse economic 
conditions or medical condition.”174 When the program was 
introduced, a HUD report estimated that it would benefit as many as 
34,474 homeowners.175 
However, like other foreclosure mitigation programs, the EHLP 
failed to meet expectations. The program benefited fewer than 12,000 
homeowners176 with only half of the allocated funds being spent.177 
Reasons for the deficiency included program start delays and 
“borrowers having difficulty meeting the eligibility criteria to qualify 
for assistance.”178 Although the program was created in July 2010, it 
was not launched until summer 2011.179 Thus, like the other 
foreclosure prevention initiatives, lackluster participation and a slow 
government rollout ultimately undermined the EHLP.  
D. Lessons for COVID-19
As this part has explained, many of the interventions used during the 
Great Recession took the form of incentive programs that encouraged 
voluntary participation among private market participants. However, 
participation in these programs was lower than expected due to a 
variety of factors. Barriers to successful implementation included 
resource constraints; the use of incentives rather than more direct 
controls; a focus on long-term place-based strategies at the expense 
of more immediate people-based strategies; slow government 
implementation; a reluctance among regulators to administer the 
programs; and low participation rates.  
As a result, these programs generally failed to reach their full 
potential. This section draws on this analysis to highlight three lessons 
for mitigation of housing instability during the COVID-19 pandemic: 
(1) housing payment assistance may be more effective than indirect
interventions; (2) grants may be more effective than tax expenditures
174 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., HOW DOES EHLP WORK?, https://archives 
.hud.gov/initiatives/ehlp/how.cfm [https://perma.cc/99H7-MLGG]. Homeowner eligibility 
was limited to households that earned up to 120% of AMI. Hollar, supra note 48, at 185. 
175 Hollar, supra note 48, at 186. 
176 Immergluck, supra note 44, at 210. 
177 KATIE JONES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40210, PRESERVING HOMEOWNERSHIP: 
FORECLOSURE PREVENTION INITIATIVES (2017), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product 
/pdf/R/R40210 [https://perma.cc/3958-ESBP]. 
178 Id. 
179 Immergluck, supra note 44, at 210. 
478 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 445 
for promoting affordable housing development during a pandemic; and 
(3) there may be a continued need for place-based interventions to
revitalize neighborhoods that are disproportionately affected by the
pandemic.
1. Housing Payment Assistance Is Preferable to Indirect Interventions
Housing payment assistance may be more effective than indirect
interventions for mitigating housing instability. Despite receiving 
a comparatively small funding allocation, the HPRR program—one 
of the few interventions to include housing payment assistance— 
was arguably more successful than other programs at mitigating 
housing instability.180 This suggests that a large-scale, fully funded 
homelessness prevention program that includes housing payment 
assistance may be beneficial to mitigate housing instability during the 
pandemic. However, onerous application processes and restrictive 
eligibility criteria would likely chill participation, preventing people 
from receiving the assistance they need. 
2. Grants Are Preferable to Tax Expenditures
Grants may be more effective than tax expenditures to support
affordable housing development. Most of the changes to the LIHTC 
remain fully or partially in place under current law,181 raising the 
question of whether further expansion would be warranted during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. There are several reasons why statutory changes 
to the LIHTC may not be effective in the current crisis. First, evidence 
from the Great Recession suggests that statutory expansions to the 
LIHTC may be insufficient to promote affordable housing 
development during a recession period when financial institutions are 
less profitable. Direct grants like TCAP may be more effective than tax 
credits at sustaining affordable housing development during crisis 
periods.  
Second, the current value of LIHTCs to investors is lower than it 
was prior to the Great Recession as tax credits are less valuable to 
investors with less tax liability. When the 2017 TCJA reduced the 
highest corporate tax rate from 35% (the rate applicable during the 
Great Recession) to 21%, the value of the LIHTC also declined.182 For 
180 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., supra note 168, at 14. 
181 See supra notes 100–02. 
182 H. Blair Kincer & Mark O’Meara, A Look at the LIHTC: Past Pricing Trends, the 
Current Market and Future Concerns, NOVOGRADAC (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.novoco 
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example, prior to tax reform, investors in Midwest and Southeast 
markets would pay $1.05 to $1.10 per dollar of tax credit, an amount 
that reflected a premium paid for points earned for compliance with the 
Community Reinvestment Act.183 In 2020, the “vast majority of deals 
get 90 cents to $1 per credit” in those same markets.184 This suggests 
that roughly 10% of federal dollars spent on affordable housing under 
the LIHTC projects are captured by investors instead of being used by 
developers. Even if this leakage is deemed acceptable during 
nonrecession periods, it suggests that LIHTC expansion would not be 
the most efficient use of emergency spending. 
3. Place-Based Interventions Are Necessary
A third lesson revealed by the uneven recovery after the Great
Recession is that place-based interventions are necessary to prevent 
long-term housing instability following a crisis. In the context of the 
pandemic, place-based intervention may be especially important if a 
prolonged pandemic causes vacancies. Both the harms associated with 
vacant and abandoned properties and the tendency for uneven 
distributions of such properties have been well documented.185  
Figure 2 visualizes data from the HUD’s USPS vacancy dataset to 
explore state-level variations in vacancies. The chart shows that state-
level vacancy rates tend to remain relatively constant over time, with 
substantial interstate variation in overall vacancy rates. Vacancy rates 
rose in all states during the Great Recession and remained elevated for 
several years before noticeably dropping in 2015. 
This may be explained in two ways. First, units in weak housing 
markets are likely to remain vacant for extended periods during 
economic crisis because landlords may prefer to keep units on the 
market and unrented rather than lowering their prices. This may be the 
most salient observation for our analysis. Second, units under 
construction but not yet occupied may remain vacant for long periods 
and, upon completion, may take time to be absorbed into the housing 
market. In either case, prolonged elevated vacancy rates are indicative 





185 Layser, supra note 148, at 23–25. 
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  Figure 2. Residential Vacancy Rate by U.S. State (2008–2020). 
States like Michigan that already have high vacancy rates may be 
particularly vulnerable to such spikes if the pandemic results in 
foreclosures. State-level statistics also mask significant variations 
across smaller geographic units. During the Great Recession, both the 
distribution of foreclosures and uneven recovery tended to 
disadvantage places with lower incomes and more racial minorities.186 
While vacancy rates may not rise to the same degree during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if steps are not taken to mitigate housing 
instability, similar patterns could emerge. 
During the pandemic, vacancies may concentrate in low-income 
areas for several reasons. Higher population density in low-income 
areas may lead to a concentration of COVID-19 outbreaks that lead to 
unemployment and, ultimately, housing instability.187 Even in the 
186 Emily T. Molina, Foreclosures, Investors, and Uneven Development During the 
Great Recession in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area, 38 J. URB. AFFS. 564, 565 (2016); 
Matthew Hall et al., Variations in Housing Foreclosures by Race and Place, 2005–2012, 
660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2015). 
187 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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absence of outbreaks, unemployment rates may be higher among 
residents of low-income neighborhoods if residents’ low-wage 
positions are not easily adapted to remote-work arrangements. 
Preexisting housing insecurity in low-income neighborhoods may 
make residents particularly vulnerable to such economic shocks. For 
these reasons, a complete policy response to the current crises should 
include strategies to mitigate the long-term impact of the pandemic on 
low-income neighborhoods.  
However, experience with the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
suggests that—at a minimum—such interventions may require higher 
funding levels than past programs if they are to have a significant 
impact. Ideally, such programs would not only target low-income areas 
that experience a high rate of vacancies but would also prioritize areas 
where such vacancies threaten neighborhoods (e.g., by increasing 
health risks or facilitating crime).188 Experience with opportunity 
zones also suggests that if place-based tax incentives are used, they 
should carefully target problem areas and define the activities eligible 
for subsidies.189 To ensure that the benefits of these interventions 
flow to neighborhood residents instead of outside investors, the law 
should also limit subsidized development to affordable housing and 
development that will benefit community residents.190 
These lessons, derived from Great Recession–era interventions, can 
help inform current strategies to mitigate housing instability during 
pandemics like COVID-19. Yet, as the next part will show, the initial 
policy response has repeated many of the same mistakes that limited 
the effectiveness of interventions during the Great Recession. Namely, 
the early interventions have failed to include direct housing payment 
assistance to homeowners. Though early interventions have included 
efforts to freeze mortgage and rental payments, those interventions 
suffered from lack of enforcement. Meanwhile, the indirect measures 
taken to mitigate housing instability during the early months of the 
COVID-19 crisis are insufficient to mitigate housing instability. The 
next part evaluates these interventions and argues that more direct 
efforts to mitigate housing instability will be necessary.  
188 Layser, supra note 148, at 56–59; see also Molina, supra note 186; Hall et al., supra 
note 186.  
189 Layser, supra note 148, at 60–61. 
190 Id. 
482 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 445 
III 
HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF: THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
As demonstrated in Part II, a variety of policy tools were 
implemented during the Great Recession to mitigate housing 
instability, but few realized their full potential. This part argues that 
many of the initial interventions during the COVID-19 crisis face 
barriers like those faced during the Great Recession. These barriers—
which include administrative hurdles, reliance on voluntary 
participation, resource constraints, and political pushback, among 
others—may prevent these interventions from effectively mitigating 
housing instability.  
Part II highlighted the importance of including direct forms of 
housing payment assistance to struggling homeowners and renters. 
Examples of direct assistance may include cash payments made 
directly to landlords or lenders, or it may include housing vouchers akin 
to the current Housing Choice Voucher program. The initial legislative 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic did not include direct housing 
payment assistance. Instead, the initial response relied upon 
(1) temporary eviction freezes and foreclosure moratoriums, and
(2) indirect interventions. As this part will demonstrate, the temporary
eviction freezes and foreclosure moratoriums were insufficient to
eliminate the need for direct housing payment assistance, and the
indirect interventions have failed to fill that gap. This part will also
explain how tax expenditures are not sufficient to reduce housing
instability.
A. Temporary Eviction Freezes and Foreclosure Moratoriums
To mitigate housing instability during the pandemic, policymakers 
may choose to provide financial assistance in either of two ways: 
sending people money or temporarily halting their recurring necessary 
expenses.191 Though the early policy response has embraced both 
strategies, housing instability has been mitigated primarily through the 
latter approach. In fact, the most direct early interventions to mitigate 
191 Pamela Foohey et al., CARES Act Gimmicks: How Not to Give People Money During 
a Pandemic and What to Do Instead, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 83 (2020), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3583464 [https://perma.cc/4Q6S-F7BX]. 
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housing instability have taken the form of foreclosure moratoriums and 
eviction freezes.192  
Federal law has been used to freeze evictions and stave off 
foreclosures on federally financed properties. The CARES Act 
provides for nationwide foreclosure moratoriums, forbearance rights, 
and eviction freezes.193 Under the law, borrowers of federally backed 
mortgages may request forbearance for up to 180 days, with an 
additional 180-day forbearance period permitted.194 Meanwhile, 
servicers of federally backed mortgages temporarily may not foreclose 
on defaulted loans.195  
The law also places a temporary moratorium on eviction filings 
against tenants living in buildings financed with federally backed 
mortgages.196 The Urban Institute estimates that “eviction moratoria 
covering federally financed properties will apply to roughly 12.3 
million (28[%]) of the 43.8 million [U.S.] rental units.”197 State-level 
eviction freezes have supplemented the federal law to cover additional 
tenant populations. As shown in Appendix A, at least forty-three states 
have implemented eviction freezes in the first few months of the 
pandemic, and at least thirty-one states have imposed foreclosure 
192 See Elmsford Apartment Assocs. v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-4062, 2020 WL 3498456, at 
*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (discussing New York’s EO 202.28, which, inter alia,
temporarily halts evictions of financially impacted tenants during the COVID-19 pandemic).
193 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 
116-136, § 4022, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). Specifically, the law applies to any loan for a
one- to four-family home insured by Federal Housing Administration, Department of
Veterans Affairs, Department of Agriculture, or purchased or securitized by Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or Federal National Mortgage Association. CARES Act
§ 4022(a)(2). The CARES Act also mandates foreclosure forbearance for greater than
four-family housing, allowing for up to three thirty-day forbearance periods for mortgage
payments due. CARES Act § 4023(c).
194 CARES Act § 4022(b). The Stout analysis cites a Furman Center study that reports, 
“About 20 percent of New York City renters live in 2–4-unit buildings. Across the nation, 
34 percent of renters live in single-family homes, with an additional 17 percent in 2–4-unit 
buildings. Rental arrears may pose particular problems for owners of smaller buildings, 
placing those owners at risk of maintaining mortgage payments.” See also STOUT, supra 
note 8, at 34. 
195 Brenda Richardson, Government Agencies Extend Foreclosure and Eviction 
Moratoriums, FORBES (June 17, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brenda 
richardson/2020/06/17/government-agencies-extend-foreclosure-and-eviction-moratoriums/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZSP4-RRUS]. 
196 CARES Act § 4024(b). 
197 Laurie Goodman et al., The CARES Act Eviction Moratorium Covers All Federally 
Financed Rentals—That’s One in Four US Rental Units, URB. INST. (Apr. 2, 2020), https: 
//www.urban.org/urban-wire/cares-act-eviction-moratorium-covers-all-federally-financed 
-rentals-thats-one-four-us-rental-units [https://perma.cc/C58U-WMAC].
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moratoriums. However, these state-level interventions vary with 
respect to the populations covered, their duration, and the degree of 
protection.198 
When they apply, these foreclosure moratoriums and eviction 
freezes are mandatory direct regulations, which differ from the 
voluntary loan modification incentives used during the Great 
Recession. Compared to the voluntary programs of the previous crisis, 
recent efforts have been relatively successful at preventing a wave of 
foreclosures and evictions even as unemployment levels have spiked to 
unprecedented levels.199 However, in addition to the limited coverage 
of the freezes, the interventions are hindered by at least two factors: 
(1) uncertainty about how past-due payments should be treated once
the moratoriums and freezes are lifted and (2) an informal (and often
illegal) practice of evicting tenants without initiating formal eviction
procedures.
Although banks have complied with the mortgage foreclosure 
moratoriums, the law provided little guidance as to how the 
moratoriums should be structured, and the approaches taken by banks 
have varied. Early reports indicated that some banks intended to require 
borrowers to repay missed payments in a lump sum at the end of the 
forbearance period.200 Many borrowers worried that they would be 
unable—after months of unemployment—to repay the full forbearance 
amount at the end of the period. While the unemployment assistance 
and stimulus payments may enable some borrowers to comply with 
such terms, others may be unable to do so if they experience delays or 
are ineligible for those relief payments.201 
In response to these concerns, “the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
announced that servicers of mortgages backed by Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae should not require lump sum repayments once the 
forbearance period ends.”202 However, borrowers with privately held 
198 Eviction Lab, COVID-19 Housing Policy Scorecard, EVICTION LAB, https://eviction 
lab.org/covid-policy-scorecard/ [https://perma.cc/JX5F-SE66]. For a comparative summary 
of states’ eviction freeze laws, see the Eviction Lab’s COVID-19 Housing Policy Scorecard. 
Id. 
199 See FISHER & FOX, supra note 69 (arguing that government programs to modify 
mortgages need to be more robust and include principal write-downs). 
200 Dima Williams, After Confusion over Lump Sum Payments, Homeowners Finally Get 
Clarification on Mortgage Forbearance, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2020, 11:08 AM), https://www 
.forbes.com/sites/dimawilliams/2020/04/27/no-you-do-not-have-to-pay-a-lump-sum-at-the 
-end-of-mortgage-forbearance/ [https://perma.cc/MF4X-7ABB].
201 See infra Section III.B.
202 Williams, supra note 200. 
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mortgages—about 30% of mortgage holders—are not protected by 
those rules, and many continue to face burdensome repayment 
requirements.203 Among homeowners with federally guaranteed 
mortgages, “confusion has lingered, with homeowners whose 
mortgages are backed by the government still being told that they’d 
have to make lump-sum payments when they resumed their loans.”204  
Similarly, questions remain as to what will happen once lawmakers 
lift eviction freezes and mortgage moratoriums. Most eviction freezes 
permit widespread eviction as soon as the freezes are lifted.205 Unless 
the social safety net is sufficient to ensure that such people will receive 
assistance that enables them to pay their housing payments when due, 
the current moratoriums and freezes may simply delay—rather than 
prevent—waves of foreclosures and evictions.  
However, it is important to note that even during the covered period, 
lack of enforcement has undercut the effectiveness of the eviction 
freezes. According to some reports, “landlords and even public-
housing authorities in some states have continued to file for eviction 
without consequences.”206 In other cases, landlords are using illegal 
“self-help” evictions to evict tenants without using formal court 
procedures, such as by changing tenants’ locks or making threats.207 
Low-income tenants may be particularly vulnerable to these tactics due 
to lack of attorney representation, lack of knowledge about their rights, 
and fear of legal repercussion.208 
Thus, these interventions fail to eliminate the need for direct housing 
payment assistance. The CARES Act included no such assistance. 
Instead, the law included several indirect efforts to mitigate housing 
instability through monetary relief to individuals and employers. The 
next section argues that these interventions are insufficient to prevent 
housing instability.  
203 Tara Siegel Bernard, Mortgage Relief That Comes with a $4,000 Bill, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/business/coronavirus-mortgage 
-relief.html [https://perma.cc/3BTU-L5HW].
204 Id.
205 Eviction Lab, supra note 198. 
206 Rebecca Burns, Landlords Illegally Evicting Tenants, Despite Federal Restrictions, 
AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 23, 2020), https://prospect.org/api/content/a9dd126e-84e1-11ea-8b47 
-1244d5f7c7c6/ [https://perma.cc/7L3X-7U8B].
207 Semuels, supra note 17.
208 MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 
(2016). 
486 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 445 
B. Overreliance on Indirect Interventions
In lieu of direct housing payment assistance, the CARES Act 
included several programs with the potential to mitigate housing 
instability indirectly. These programs included monetary relief 
for individuals, such as unemployment insurance and stimulus 
payments,209 as well as assistance to employers in the form of loan 
programs.210 Unlike direct housing payment assistance, which directly 
targets distressed homeowners or renters for the express purpose of 
mitigating housing instability, these programs address housing 
instability only indirectly. For this reason, this section characterizes 
such programs as “indirect” assistance, even when some monetary 
assistance is provided directly to individuals—and it argues that 
overreliance on these indirect interventions will be insufficient to 
mitigate housing instability during the pandemic. 
1. Monetary Relief for Individuals
a. Unemployment Assistance
Among the indirect forms of relief, the most promising early
intervention to prevent housing-insecure people from slipping into 
homelessness has been a major expansion of the unemployment 
insurance safety net. The CARES Act expands unemployment 
insurance along numerous dimensions. It expands (1) the qualification 
criteria for covered workers; (2) the amount of time people are eligible 
to remain within the unemployment compensation system; (3) the 
amount of benefits people receive from unemployment compensation; 
and (4) the availability of short-time unemployment compensation, 
otherwise known as work-share programs. All these interventions have 
significant potential to mitigate housing instability. 
However, the effectiveness of these interventions may be limited 
by several factors. These factors include structural features of 
state unemployment programs, administrative challenges and 
implementation delays, and the voluntary nature of some of the 
interventions. As a result, the capacities and actions of state 
governments and private market participants may present barriers to 
effective administration of the federal unemployment assistance 
program.  
209 See infra Section III.B.1. 
210 See infra Section III.B.2. 
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The most significant expansion of unemployment insurance under 
the CARES Act is the Federal Pandemic Unemployment 
Compensation (FPUC) program, which provides an additional $600 
per week to anyone receiving any form of unemployment insurance 
compensation until July 31, 2020.211 The potential reach of this benefit 
is bolstered by two other changes under the law—expanded eligibility 
criteria and extended coverage periods.212 However, for reasons to be 
explained in this section, implementation delays and the structure of 
states’ existing unemployment systems may nevertheless limit the 
program’s potential to mitigate housing instability. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that the scope of unemployment 
assistance under the CARES Act is unprecedented. The $600 
supplement to states’ existing unemployment insurance is sufficient to 
bring the national average replacement rate, the ratio of average 
unemployment benefits to average wages in each state, close to 
100%.213 For many low-wage workers, the extra $600 per week could 
yield more compensation than if they had remained employed.214  
The CARES Act also provides significant support to many workers 
who normally would not qualify for unemployment benefits. 
Specifically, self-employed individuals (e.g., gig workers), part- 
time employees, and those with limited employment history may be 
eligible to receive up to thirty-nine weeks of benefits if they are unable 
to work as a result of COVID-19.215 The CARES Act also provides an 
211 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 
116-136, § 2104(b), 134 Stat. 318 (2020). This extra $600 per week is disregarded for
purposes of determining eligibility for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP). CARES Act § 2104(h). The CARES Act also supports short-time
compensation programs known as work-share programs. CARES Act §§ 2108–10. This
program allows employers to reduce employees’ hours to avoid layoffs. I.R.C.
§ 3306(v); Greg Iacurci, This Is a Lucrative — but Little-Used — Unemployment Benefit:
‘It’s a Complete Windfall,’ CNBC (June 2, 2020, 12:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com
/2020/06/02/work-sharing-programs-are-a-lucrative-but-little-used-unemployment-benefit
.html [https://perma.cc/CU4A-XMMU]; U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION 
(STC), https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/stc.asp [https://perma.cc/GQF5-AK9W]. In return,
employees of a participating employer can collect unemployment benefits to cover part of
the lost income from the reduction in hours. Id. However, as of May 9, fewer than 1% of the
31 million Americans collecting unemployment were doing so under the short-time
compensation program.
212 See infra notes 212–14 and accompanying text. 
213 Ella Koeze, The $600 Unemployment Booster Shot, State by State, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/23/business/economy 
/unemployment-benefits-stimulus-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/D9MR-PEW6]. 
214 Id. 
215 CARES Act §§ 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I)–(II), (c)(1)–(2). CARES Act § 2102(a)(3)(A) 
(ii)(I) outlines eleven reasons that qualify one as unemployed because of this pandemic. 
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extension of unemployment compensation for those who have 
exhausted their regular and extended unemployment benefits.216 
This thirteen-week extension includes the normal unemployment 
compensation and the additional $600 per week.217  
If effective, these interventions stand to mitigate housing instability 
by providing unemployed workers the income support necessary to 
meet necessities, including rents and mortgages. However, some 
features of the law may prevent it from realizing its full potential. Most 
significantly, all these programs are funded by the federal government 
but implemented by the states. This structure may result in regional 
variations in implementation that render the program more effective in 
some places than others. Such variation will likely stem from 
(1) differences in states’ capacities to administer an unemployment
insurance program of this scale, and (2) differences in states’ capacities
or willingness to provide large unemployment insurance safety nets.
In many states, the unemployment insurance system has been 
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of applications for benefits.218 In 
some states, an IT infrastructure of antiquated hardware that could not 
handle the sudden rush of claims has compounded this problem.219 
Note that some categories of workers, such as undocumented immigrants and those who 
work in criminalized markets (e.g., sex work, illegal drug sales) are not covered by 
unemployment insurance. Though there may be strong public policy reasons to exclude such 
groups from coverage, the failure to assist these groups will leave them particularly 
vulnerable to housing instability. 
216 CARES Act § 2107(a)(1)–(3). 
217 CARES Act § 2107(a)(4). 
218 Robert Iafolla, For Jobless Gig Workers, Stimulus Bill Benefits No Silver Bullet, 
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/4/20/21220931/unemployment-insurance-coronavirus-websites-crashing [https://perma.cc
/DZN3-L2LX]; Matthew Haag, They Filed for Unemployment Last Month. They Haven’t
Seen a Dime., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/nyregion
/coronavirus-pandemic-unemployment-assistance-ny-delays.html [https://perma.cc/6ZEH
-W9WY]; Nelson D. Schwartz et al., Stymied in Seeking Benefits, Millions of Unemployed
Go Uncounted, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/business
/economy/coronavirus-unemployment-claims.html [https://perma.cc/BA8J-5R8U].
219 Nilsen, supra note 218; Haag, supra note 218; Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, 
America’s Social Safety Net Wasn’t Ready for the Coronavirus Crisis, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Apr. 8, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americas-social-safety-net-wasnt-ready-for 
-the-coronavirus-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/GP5S-CVRE]; Weeds, supra note 218; Schwartz
et al., supra note 218; Klint Finley, Can’t File for Unemployment? Don’t Blame Cobol,
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Meanwhile, states have been tasked with the implementation 
and administration of new unemployment benefits under the CARES 
Act and have had to rapidly increase the number of government 
employees available. Even with the additional flexibility provided 
under the CARES Act,220 this has resulted in significant delays in 
implementation.  
As a result, many self-employed people have been unable to 
promptly receive unemployment benefits.221 Claiming unemployment 
benefits has required significant persistence on the part of unemployed 
workers to overcome the administrative hurdles. Lack of persistence 
may negatively impact take-up rates. If unable to receive their entitled 
benefits, some are likely to lose housing quickly—especially when the 
eviction freezes and foreclosure moratoriums expire.  
Even if perfectly implemented, the law would likely mitigate 
housing insecurity in some states more effectively than others. The 
reason stems from differences in states’ capacities or willingness to 
provide large unemployment insurance safety nets. For example, state 
laws vary in the duration and level of generosity of their weekly 
unemployment benefits.222 And although the $600 supplement may 
help fill gaps, it applies uniformly and does not adjust for cost of 
living.223 As a result, the real economic value of the federal benefit will 
vary across geographies, making it particularly important that states’ 
baseline unemployment benefits provide a sufficient safety net. 
Furthermore, some states, like Florida, have placed onerous restrictions 
on unemployment and other social safety net programs, making it 
difficult for people to access them even in times of need.224 As a result, 
restrictions designed to prevent benefits from reaching the wrong 
WIRED (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/cant-file-unemployment-dont-blame 
-cobol/ [https://perma.cc/4HWE-URVX].
220 Nilsen, supra note 218; Haag, supra note 218; Thomson-DeVeaux, supra note 219;
Weeds, supra note 218; Schwartz et al., supra note 218; Finley, supra note 219.
221 WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2020, 5:37 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2020/04/02/uber-airbnb-lyft-unemployment-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/J2T5-KJC6];
Weeds, supra note 218; Schwartz et al., supra note 218.
222 Thomson-DeVeaux, supra note 219. 
223 Id.; Koeze, supra note 213; Schwartz et al., supra note 218. 
224 Gary Fineout & Marc Caputo, ‘It’s a Sh— Sandwich’: Republicans Rage as Florida 
Becomes a Nightmare for Trump, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:02 AM), https://www.politico 
.com/states/florida/story/2020/04/03/its-a-sh-sandwich-republicans-rage-as-florida-becomes 
-a-nightmare-for-trump-1271172 [https://perma.cc/Y4TG-WYP2]; Weeds, supra note 218;
Rebecca Vallas, Republicans Wrapped the Safety Net in Red Tape. Now We’re All
Suffering., WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2020, 11:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2020/04/15/republicans-harder-access-safety-net/ [https://perma.cc/TH4T-UDGN].
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people may cause significant harms to those who are entitled to 
benefits.225 
In addition to these barriers to effective implementation, other 
problems loom. First, the limited duration of the federal supplement 
may remove an important intervention that helps those who are housing 
insecure. A failure to extend this program may harm people in those 
states with inadequate benefits, exacerbating housing instability.226 
This would lead to a public health crisis by potentially creating a 
surge of the homeless population that, in turn, leads to a new surge in 
COVID-19 cases and deaths. 
Second, states’ fiscal health may present additional risks. While the 
federal government fully funds the new benefits, traditional regular 
benefits and extended benefits are still partially funded by the states.227 
Now with a fall in revenues, states have had to borrow from the federal 
government to meet these needs, which could lead to additional delays 
and future fiscal crises that exacerbate housing instability.228 
b. Stimulus Payments
In addition to ongoing unemployment assistance, the CARES Act
also provided for a single cash payment to be delivered to all people—
regardless of work status—except for nonresident alien individuals and 
225 Weeds, supra note 218. Indeed, as of July, about three months after the passage of 
the CARES Act’s expanded unemployment benefits, many people entitled to these benefits 
still have not had their claims processed or received benefits. Eli Rosenberg, Workers Are 
Pushed to the Brink as They Continue to Wait for Delayed Unemployment Payments, WASH. 
POST (July 13, 2020, 3:40 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/13 
/unemployment-payment-delays/ [https://perma.cc/X2LU-EXR7]. 
226 See Ella Nilsen, Exclusive: One Democrat’s Plan to Stretch Expanded 
Unemployment Insurance Through December, VOX (May 1, 2020, 8:10 AM), https:// 
www.vox.com/2020/5/1/21241850/expanded-unemployment-insurance-benefits-december 
[https://perma.cc/QYL2-2DDP]. 
227 What Is the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, and How Is It Financed?, TAX. 
POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-unemployment-insurance 
-trust-fund-and-how-it-financed [https://perma.cc/37H8-DWQF] (describing how traditional
unemployment insurance programs are funded through state-federal partnerships).
228 Sarah Chaney, California Is First State to Borrow from Federal Government to 
Make Unemployment Payments, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2020, 5:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/california-is-first-state-to-borrow-from-federal-government-to-make-unemployment 
-payments-11588617257 [https://perma.cc/KJN4-36SP]; Brian Galle, The States Should
Quickly Reform Unemployment Insurance Programs to Prevent Economic Harm, MEDIUM
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-states-should-quickly
-reform-unemployment-insurance-programs-to-prevent-economic-harm-8099b277042b
[https://perma.cc/E595-LTRD].
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individuals claimed as dependents on other people’s tax returns.229 
Because the law does not contain any minimum income requirement, 
the payment is available to even the poorest individuals.230 For this 
reason, although the payment is primarily intended as an economic 
stimulus, it also serves as a limited social safety net for many 
recipients. This payment may be especially important in cases when 
unemployment assistance is delayed. 
Specifically, the payment was structured as a refundable tax credit 
to offset individuals’ 2020 tax liability—but the payment was to be paid 
in advance and adjusted, if necessary, when taxes are filed.231 Subject 
to phaseouts,232 the amount of the credit was up to $1,200 for an 
eligible individual or $2,400 for eligible individuals filing a joint 
return.233 Eligible individuals with children received an additional 
$500 per child.234  
However, the delivery of stimulus payments was more difficult than 
anticipated.235 Despite the effort to simplify the process by distributing 
payments to taxpayers via direct deposit,236 many people received 
229 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-
136, § 2201(a), 134 Stat. 318 (2020) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6428(d)). 
230 CARES Act § 2201(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6428(d)). Note, however, that 
recipients must possess and remember a valid social security number to claim the payment. 
Id. 
231 CARES Act § 2201(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6428(a), (b), (e), (f)). 
232 However, the credit phases out for eligible individuals with an adjusted gross income 
(AGI) over $75,000. CARES Act § 2201(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6428(c)(3)). For those 
eligible individuals who file a joint return, the phaseout starts above $150,000, while for 
heads of household it starts above $112,500. CARES Act § 2201(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6428(c)(1), (2)). The phaseout decreases the credit by 5% for each dollar above these
defined thresholds. In other words, for each $100 above the phaseout amount, the credit
decreases by $5. Id. Thus, for an eligible individual the credit disappears at an AGI of
$99,000, at $198,000 for those who file a joint return, and $136,500 for a head of household
filer.
233 CARES Act § 2201(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6428(a)(1)). 
234 Id.  
235 See Richard Rubin, The Government Wants to Send You Money—but How Soon 
Will It Arrive?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2020, 3:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the 
-government-wants-to-send-you-moneybut-how-soon-will-it-arrive-11584558455 [https://
perma.cc/RS4K-DDQY] (noting that the difficult policy problem of getting money to people
accurately and quickly, the problems with a reduced IRS capacity because of budget cuts,
and the issues regarding people for whom the government lacks contact).
236 Lisa Rein, IRS to Begin Issuing $1,200 Coronavirus Payments April 9, but Some 
Americans Won’t Receive Checks Until September, Agency Plan Says, WASH. POST 
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amounts that did not cover dependent children or had other glitches.237 
Other barriers to the efficient rollout of stimulus payments included 
technological issues, missing identification data, and the vulnerability 
to scammers. 
First, technological issues resulted in the rejection of direct deposits 
to many low-income taxpayers who used tax preparation services or 
software to claim their earned income tax credit.238 Many of these 
companies allow such taxpayers to pay for the preparation services 
from their refund.239 When claimants use these services, the return 
preparer creates a bank account for direct deposit, and the money is 
transferred to the taxpayer after deducting fees.240 However, when the 
IRS attempted to deposit stimulus payments into those accounts, the 
banks rejected the payments.241 This resulted in confusion and delays 
for many of the lowest-income taxpayers,242 many of whom are 
housing insecure.243 
Second, missing identification data delayed payments to a large 
portion of housing-insecure people who have not filed taxes in recent 
years.244 People who are not on Social Security or Veterans Benefits 
must go to a website to enter either direct deposit information or their 
address.245 But this application system was available only online, and 
237 Richard Rubin, When the Stimulus Check in Your Bank Account Isn’t What You 
Expected, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-the 
-stimulus-check-in-your-bank-account-isnt-what-you-expected-11587054049 [https://perma
.cc/86PV-MT38]; Heather Long & Michelle Singletary, Glitches Prevent $1,200 Stimulus
Checks From Reaching Millions of Americans, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:13 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/16/coronavirus-cares-stimulus-check/
[https://perma.cc/LKX2-QN7U].
238 Paul Kiel et al., Millions of People Face Stimulus Check Delays for a Strange 







243 See supra Section I.A. 
244 Ron Lieber & Alan Rappeport, Needy Will Face Hurdles to Getting Coronavirus 
Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/business 
/coronavirus-stimulus-social-security.html [https://perma.cc/69G5-3P4N]. 
245 Laura Saunders & Richard Rubin, IRS Adds New Ways to Claim Coronavirus 
Stimulus Payments for Low Earners, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2020, 12:18 PM), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/irs-adds-ways-for-low-earners-to-claim-stimulus-payments-11586533870 
[https://perma.cc/4B5N-ZGR4]; Richard Rubin, Social Security Recipients Won’t Need to 
File Tax Returns for Coronavirus Stimulus Payment, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2020, 9:09 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-security-recipients-wont-need-to-file-tax-returns-for 
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many poor people who are housing insecure lack access to the 
internet—particularly when libraries and free tax clinics are closed due 
to shelter-in-place orders.246 This inability to access the application 
website means that many low-income people experienced delays or 
never received their payments. 
Third, scams have emerged as a serious problem, particularly for 
those who have not recently filed taxes.247 As a result of data breaches, 
the dark web is full of personal information that criminals can use to 
claim nonfilers’ stimulus payments.248 If nonfilers fail to claim their 
payments via the website described above, then an identity thief may 
claim their payment instead.249 For this reason, in addition to 
addressing the internet access issues, it will be essential to raise 
awareness about the availability of future stimulus payments and the 
steps needed to claim them. Otherwise, take-up rates may be lower than 
anticipated. 
In addition to these barriers to effective implementation, unintended 
transaction costs may also undermine the goals of the economic 
stimulus payments. About 6.5% of Americans do not have a bank 
account, and about 25% of all Americans are underbanked, meaning 
that although they have a bank account, “they use other financial 
services.”250 When receiving a check like the stimulus payment, many 
of these individuals turn to check cashers, who charge exorbitant 
fees.251 Other options like preloaded ATM cards or other financial 
-coronavirus-stimulus-payment-11585787205 [https://perma.cc/3YPD-YC5Q]. But if these
people had qualifying children for the $500, they still had to go to the IRS online tool to get
that other amount at some point in April 2020, or risk having to wait until next year for that
amount. Michelle Singletary, If You’re One of These American Taxpayers, the Deadline to
File for a $500-per-Child Stimulus Check Has Passed, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2020, 12:27
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/20/if-youre-one-these-american
-taxpayers-you-have-until-noon-wednesday-file-500-per-child-stimulus-check/.
246 Lieber & Rappeport, supra note 244.
247 Nathaniel Popper, ‘Pure Hell for Victims’ as Stimulus Programs Draw a Flood of




250 Tory Newmyer, The Finance 202: Cash-Strapped Americans Will Face Excruciating 




251 Lieber & Rappeport, supra note 244. 
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technology payment delivery may be appealing for speed, but fees may 
reduce the amount of the payment that reaches the recipient.252  
Furthermore, features of the law itself may limit the effectiveness 
of the economic stimulus payments for mitigating housing instability. 
For example, the statute excludes several groups of people who 
may disproportionately experience housing instability, including 
nonresident aliens and those without work-authorized social security 
numbers, such as undocumented immigrants.253 These exclusions may 
lead to a spike in homelessness within these vulnerable populations. 
Although the law provides additional stimulus to households with 
children, it excludes adult dependents from this calculation.254 As a 
result, the parents of college students255 or caregivers of elderly 
dependents will not receive additional stimulus payments despite the 
extra costs associated with supporting them.256 To the extent that 
current economic conditions strain the finances of these families, the 
lack of additional stimulus support may lead to housing instability 
among these families.257 
Finally, because the statute provides for flat $1,200 payments 
throughout the country,258 the impact of the payment will vary based 
on cost of living. For example, a family living in a high cost of living 
area—including some of the major metropolitan areas that have 
become public health hot spots—may not see significant financial relief 
from these payments. Residents of lower cost of living areas, on the 
252 Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Silicon Valley Companies Are Rolling Out 
Coronavirus Stimulus Check Services, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2020, 6:28 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology-202/2020/04/16 
/the-technology-202-silicon-valley-companies-are-rolling-out-coronavirus-stimulus-check 
-services/5e9764e388e0fa101a763bac/ [https://perma.cc/QV6N-DZQS]; Katanga Johnson,
U.S. Pre-Paid Card Providers Angle for Slice of Stimulus Check Action: Industry
Groups, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2020, 12:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health
-coronavirus-stimulus-cards/u-s-pre-paid-card-providers-angle-for-slice-of-stimulus-check
-action-industry-groups-idUSKCN2253FL [https://perma.cc/TSB5-YBAF].
253 Richard Rubin, Who’s Left Out of Coronavirus Stimulus Payments? Many College




255 Id.; Terry Nguyen, Why Millions of College Students and Young Adults Won’t Get a
Stimulus Check, VOX (Apr. 15, 2020, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2020/4
/15/21222170/stimulus-checks-dependents-excluded.
256 Rubin, supra note 237. 
257 Id. 
258 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-
136, § 2201(a), 134 Stat. 318 (2020) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6428(a)(1)). 
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other hand, may benefit greatly from the payments. The failure to adjust 
for variations in regional housing costs or other cost of living indicators 
could lead to a geographically uneven distribution of mitigation for 
housing instability. 
Thus, although the stimulus payments have the potential to reach 
low-income populations that may be overlooked by the other 
interventions targeted specifically to workers, several challenges may 
limit the impact of the program. As this section has explained, the full 
potential for the stimulus program to mitigate housing instability may 
be limited by implementation problems, transaction costs, and 
structural aspects of the law that disadvantage certain populations. As 
a result, some people may encounter delayed payments, reduced 
payments, or no payments at all—thereby limiting the extent to which 
the stimulus payments can help mitigate housing instability.259 
2. Monetary Relief for Employers
A second form of indirect mitigation of housing instability during
the pandemic has taken the form of monetary relief for employers. The 
CARES Act greatly expanded the funds available for employers to 
borrow to help them keep current staff employed and on payroll. As 
described below, the new Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) provides 
for significant loans to be extended to small businesses. The law also 
expanded the Emergency Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) Grant 
Program, an existing lending program that authorizes the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) to make loans available to small 
business employers.260 While these programs have the potential to help 
struggling homeowners and renters indirectly by assisting their 
employers, this section argues that their capacity to mitigate housing 
instability has been limited by their failure to support small businesses. 
a. Paycheck Protection Program
The CARES Act created the PPP, which authorized over $670.3
billion in loans to employers.261 Eligible loan recipients include small 
259 See Popper, supra note 247 (“‘I cried all day,’ said [Krystal] Phelps, who is about a 
month away from being unable to pay her mortgage and has cut out everything but the 
basics, canceling cable and eliminating snacks for the kids. ‘It is a little relief, and then you 
find out it isn’t happening.’”). 
260 Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536, as amended, § 7(a). 
261 CARES Act § 1102(a)(2), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(A)(iii); CARES 
Act § 1102(b)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 116-139, § 101(a) (adding an additional $331 
billion when the initial $349 billion was depleted within two weeks); see Danielle 
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businesses that employ 500 or fewer employees,262 as well as sole 
proprietors, independent contractors, and self-employed individuals.263 
Under the statute, these borrowers can receive a maximum loan amount 
that is the lesser of $10 million or 2.5 times their average monthly 
payroll amount.264 If an employer uses at least 60% of the loan 
proceeds for payroll costs and any additional proceeds to cover rent, 
utility payments, and interest on a mortgage, then the loan can be 
forgiven in full.265 These amounts must be paid by the business in the 
covered period starting with the origination date of the loan and ending 
on the earlier of twenty-four weeks or December 31, 2020.266 
Kurtzleben, Small Business Emergency Relief Program Hits $349 Billion Cap in Less 
than 2 Weeks, NPR (Apr. 16, 2020, 11:13 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus 
-live-updates/2020/04/16/835958069/small-business-emergency-relief-program-hits-349
-billion-cap-in-less-than-2-week [https://perma.cc/5ZCU-624L]. The Paycheck Protection
Program Flexibility Act of 2020 (PPPF Act) has modified certain provisions of the Small
Business Act and the CARES Act to provide more flexibility in the PPP program. PPPF Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-142, 134 Stat. 641 (2020).
262 CARES Act § 1102(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D)). These include 
nonprofit organizations, veterans’ organizations, or Tribal business concerns. Id. The 
affiliation rules for businesses in the accommodation and food service industry can qualify 
each location as if it were a separate business concern, so long as there are 500 or fewer 
employees at each location. CARES Act § 1102(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36) 
(D)(iii)). 
263 CARES Act § 1102(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)–(ii)). Indepen-
dent contractors do not qualify as employees compensated by a business for the purpose of 
calculating loan forgiveness. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes: Paycheck 
Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, 20814 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. 
pt. 120) (Q&A 2.p.). An Interim Final Rule also excludes hedge funds, private equity firms, 
and firms in bankruptcy from the program. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes: 
Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 23450, 23451 (Apr. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 
13 C.F.R. pt. 120–21) (Q&A 2.a., 4.). Firms that likely could have received capital 
elsewhere, like publicly traded companies, and thus did not meet the self-certification 
standard are also excluded but can return funds if they improperly received them by May 
14, 2020. Id. at 23451–52 (Q&A 5), modified by 85 Fed. Reg. 30835, 30835–37 (May 21, 
2020). 
264 CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(E)); see CARES 
Act § 1102(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(L)) (stating interest must be below 
4%); Business Loan Program Temporary Changes: Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (Q&A 2.i.) (setting 
interest rate at 1%).  
265 CARES Act § 1106(d)(8), amended by Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3(b)(2)(B). 
266 CARES Act § 1106(a)(3), amended by Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3(b) (extending the 
covered period from eight weeks to twenty-four weeks). The amount forgiven can be 
adjusted downward if there is a reduction in the number of employees or in the wages of 
employees, though there are exceptions, for example, if the business, because of public 
health measures cannot resume the same level of activity. CARES Act § 1106(d)(2), (d)(3), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3(b)(2)(B). Borrowers must certify that the funds 
are needed to meet ongoing operating costs because of current economic conditions. 
CARES Act § 1102(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(G)); Business Loan Program 
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The PPP loans are distributed by banks and other lending 
institutions, with the SBA as a guarantor of 100% of the loan 
amounts.267 These institutions were to issue loans on a first-come, first-
served basis, prioritizing businesses “in underserved and rural markets, 
including veterans and members of the military community, small 
business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically 
disadvantaged individuals . . . , women, and businesses in operation for 
less than [two] years.”268 
Yet a series of implementation problems have prevented PPP loans 
from meeting expectations, particularly in the case of very small 
businesses. First, delayed issuance of guidance led to mass confusion 
and long waits in the initial days of the program.269 Second, banks 
Temporary Changes: Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, 20814 (Apr. 15, 
2020) (to be codified as 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (Q&A t.). To qualify for forgiveness, 60% of the 
loan proceeds must go to payroll costs, while 40% can go to rent, mortgage interest, or 
utilities. CARES Act § 1106(d)(8), amended by Pub. L. No. 116-142, § 3(b)(2)(B). 
267 CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(F)). $30 million 
was set aside for distribution by community financial institutions and insured depository 
institutions and credit unions with consolidated assets of $10 million to $50 million. 
Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139, 
§ 101(d), 134 Stat. 620, 621–22 (2020).
268 CARES Act § 1102(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(P)(iv)); Business Loan
Program Temporary Changes: Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20811, 20813 
(Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120) (Q&A 2.m.). 
269 Stacy Cowley, Banks Warn of ‘Overwhelming’ Demand and Messy Start for Small 
Business Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/business 
/small-business-coronavirus-stimulus.html [https://perma.cc/ZE2Y-9AY4]; Stacy Cowley 
& Emily Flitter, Frenzy and Desperation as Small Businesses Grab for Government 
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/business/sba-loans 
-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/7T6S-92UQ]; see also Yuka Hayashi, Small-Business
Loan Program Resumes with Reports of Delays, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 27, 2020, 6:42 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/small-business-loan-program-resumes-with-reports-of-delays
-11588013225 [https://perma.cc/BK7E-T9DB] (noting problems persisting even into the
second tranche of funding); Stacy Cowley, Bankers Rebuke S.B.A. as Loan System Crashes
in Flood of Applications, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04
/27/business/sba-loan-system-crash.html [https://perma.cc/4R7S-QQDG]. Guidance was so
slow for sole proprietors, individual contractors, and the self-employed that by the time
they received the information, the initial $349 billion of funding had already run dry.
Amara Omeokwe & Charity L. Scott, Freelancers and Self-Employed Workers Undone
by Late Start in Coronavirus Stimulus Program, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/freelancers-and-self-employed-workers-undone-by-late-start
-in-coronavirus-stimulus-program-11588075202 [https://perma.cc/DX4C-3MYM] (noting
that guidelines for the self-employed were not released until April 14, 2020); see also 85
Fed. Reg. 21747, 21748–50 (Apr. 20, 2020) (outlining the rules for self-employed, sole
proprietors, and independent contractors); Amara Omeokwe, Lawmakers in Congress Press
for Changes in Small-Business Aid Program, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2020, 11:23 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-in-congress-press-for-changes-in-small-business
-aid-program-11588507201 [https://perma.cc/3GTZ-BH4V]. The problematic initial rollout
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administered the PPP loans in ways that disadvantaged the smallest 
businesses. For example, large banks prioritized loans to existing 
customers with which they had strong relationships.270 Furthermore, 
some banks refused to give loans to businesses that lacked existing 
loans or credit cards, disproportionately harming smaller businesses 
and benefiting larger ones.271  
Third, although Congress acted to replenish the PPP funding after it 
initially ran out, as of June 30, 2020, about $130 billion in aid remained 
unused.272 Some of the many reasons why there was leftover money 
stemmed from the fact that many small businesses were concerned as 
led to many small businesses deciding to not use the program. See supra notes 253–54 and 
accompanying text. 
270 See Ruth Simon & Peter Rudegeair, In Race for Small-Business Loans, Winning 
Hinged on Where Firms Bank, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/in-race-for-small-business-loans-winning-hinged-on-where-firms-bank-11587410 
421 [https://perma.cc/Q2K3-NF7U] (discussing how bank and SBA relationships helped 
secure a PPP loan); Peter Rudegeair et al., Small Businesses Were at a Breaking Point. Small 
Banks Came to the Rescue., WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2020, 9:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/small-businesses-were-at-a-breaking-point-small-banks-came-to-the-rescue-1158 
8590013 [https://perma.cc/GJR3-LNJT] (discussing how small banks were more effective 
at disbursing the funds). Moreover, less than 10% of Community Development Financial 
Institutions—the community banks that more frequently lend more equitably, i.e., those that 
lend at greater rates to women- and minority-owned businesses—are participating 
in PPP. See Emily Flitter, Black-Owned Businesses Could Face Hurdles in Federal 
Aid Program, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business 
/minority-business-coronavirus-loans.html [https://perma.cc/B2QG-GWUX].  
271 Cowley & Flitter, supra note 269; Stacy Cowley et al., Small-Business Loan 
Program, Chaotic From Start, Gets 2nd Round, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/business/ppp-small-business-loans.html [https://perma.cc/2ZXA 
-EQJU] (noting how connections helped in securing a loan in the first round); Alan
Rappeport & Jeanna Smialek, Treasury Clarifies Small-Business Loans as Fed Vows
Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/us
/politics/coronavirus-treasury-fed-small-business-loans.html [https://perma.cc/J7WV-V5DR]
(discussing how Shake Shack and other large chains got loans that Treasury wants them to
return). Treasury and the SBA later said that larger businesses, like publicly traded
companies, should return the money. Kate Davidson, Mnuchin Says Big Companies Should
Apologize for Taking Small Business Loans, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/mnuchin-warns-larger-companies-against-seeking-coronavirus-funds
-meant-for-small-businesses-11588083665 [https://perma.cc/YAC2-3LSX]; Jeanne Whalen,
Vague Rules for Paycheck Protection Program Complicate Treasury Effort to Claw Back
Money, WASH. POST (May 5, 2020, 11:38 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/2020/05/05/vague-rules-paycheck-protection-program-complicate-treasury-effort
-claw-back-funds/ [https://perma.cc/FJ7J-4BQD].
272 See Stacy Cowley, $130 Billion Left at Paycheck Program Deadline, but Senate
Acts to Extend It, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30
/business/paycheck-protection-program-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/S6V3-FGVJ].
Pub. L. No. 116-147 extended the application deadline for PPP loans to August 8, 2020.
Pub. L. No. 116-147, 134 Stat. 660 (2020).
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to whether they would have full forgiveness of the loan, given the 
shifting rules of the program.273 Furthermore, the botched rollout may 
have reduced confidence in the program, ultimately chilling uptake 
during later stages of the program. Finally, many small businesses 
could not benefit from PPP given the relatively short time frame it 
covers considering the potentially long duration of various public 
health restrictions as the virus ebbs and flows.274  
The failure of PPP loans to support many small businesses limits its 
effectiveness to mitigate housing instability.275 First, many women- 
and minority-owned businesses did not get loans,276 despite being 
specifically listed as intended recipients.277 Business owners with 
certain criminal histories were excluded from receiving funds.278 In 
many cases, the owners of such businesses have invested significant 
273 See Cowley et al., supra note 271. 
274 See Emily Flitter, ‘I Can’t Keep Doing This:’ Small-Business Owners Are Giving 
Up, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/business/small 
-businesses-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/QCH7-HAY7].
275 The number of active business owners decreased by 3.3 million (22%) between
February and April 2020. Black-owned businesses fell by 41%, Latinx by 32%, Asian by
26%, and female by 25%. Robert W. Fairlie, The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business
Owners: Evidence of Early-Stage Losses from the April 2020 Current Population Survey 1
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch. Working Paper, Paper No. 27309, 2020), http://www.nber
.org/papers/w27309 [https://perma.cc/X6WC-8225] (“[C]oncentrations of female, black,
Latinx and Asian businesses in industries hit hard by the pandemic contributed to why losses
were higher for these groups than the national average loss.”). Id. at 2.
276 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 20-14, FLASH
REPORT: SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PAYCHECK 
PROTECTION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (2020), at 4 [hereinafter SBA OIG]; Flitter, supra
note 270; Danielle Kurtzleben, Minority-Owned Small Businesses Were Supposed to Get
Priority. They May Not Have, NPR (May 12, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05
/12/853934104/minority-owned-small-businesses-were-supposed-to-get-priority-they-may
-not-have [https://perma.cc/V92U-FT25].
277 See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L.
No. 116-136, § 1102(a)(2), 134 Stat. 318 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(P)(iv))
(noting that loan distribution should prioritize businesses “in underserved and rural markets,
including . . . small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals . . . , women, and businesses in operation for less than 2 years”).
The IG faulted the SBA and Treasury for failing to promulgate sufficient guidance for how
to prioritize women- and minority-owned businesses or to collect data to aid in this effort.
SBA OIG, supra note 276, at 4; CARES Act § 1102(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)
(36)(P)(iv)).
278 See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM APPLICATION FORM,
SBA FORM 2483 (03/20), OMB Control No. 3245-0407 (Expiration Date: 09/30/2020),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/Borrower%20Paycheck%20Protection%20
Program%20Application_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NAX-TDUV]. Such exclusion increased
the likelihood of preventing more Black and Latinx owners from accessing emergency
loans. See Defy Ventures, Inc. v. United States SBA, No. CCB-20-1838, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114047 (D. Md. June 29, 2020) (Compl. § 12, Exhibit D).
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personal capital or employ members of their own families.279 As a 
result, they are at particularly high risk of experiencing housing 
instability.  
Second, small businesses are major employers and major players in 
a community. Even with growing consolidation in the business sector, 
small businesses still employed 47% of workers in 2017.280 If a small 
business shutters, not only do the employees of that business lose their 
jobs but there are also larger ripple effects. Within communities, small 
businesses are often economic and social anchors, and their exit can 
devastate entire neighborhoods’ commercial viability.281 As a result, 
their failure can threaten entire local economies, especially in small 
towns—ultimately creating a ripple effect that leads to increased 
housing instability.282  
b. Emergency Economic Injury Disaster Loan Grants
A second intervention to support employers is similarly unlikely to
mitigate housing risk by propping up small businesses. Specifically, the 
279 Tomaz Cajner et al., The U.S. Labor Market During the Beginning of the Pandemic 
Recession 41 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ. at U. Chicago Working Paper, Paper No. 
2020-58, 2020), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/working-paper/2020-58 [https://perma.cc/5P8N 
-8MZF].
280 Heather Long, Small Business Used to Define America’s Economy. The Pandemic
Could Change That Forever., WASH. POST (May 12, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/12/small-business-used-define-americas-economy
-pandemic-could-end-that-forever [https://perma.cc/76BZ-CH94].
281 Id.; Cajner et al., supra note 279, at 41. Good restaurants, for example, can “support
tourism and the neighborhood they are in” by increasing foot traffic to the local commercial
sector writ large. Jennifer Steinhauer & Pete Wells, As Restaurants Remain Shuttered,
American Cities Fear the Future, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/05/07/us/coronavirus-restaurants-closings.html [https://perma.cc/V7CG-32KR]. They
employ about 9.7 million Americans. Id. But local restaurants have been underfunded by
the PPP. While workers in food service and bars represent about 60% of nonfarm job
losses in March 2020, the accommodation and food services sector received only 8.9% of
the overall share of first-round PPP funds. Justin Lahart, Federal Small-Business Aid: Too
Little Bang, Too Few Bucks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2020, 12:22 PM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/federal-small-business-aid-too-little-bang-too-few-bucks-11588263751 https://
perma.cc/RY4P-WBSK]. Notably, one survey indicates that restauranteurs estimate their
survival at a rate of 15% if the crisis lasts six months. Alexander W. Bartik et al., How Are
Small Businesses Adjusting to COVID-19? Early Evidence from a Survey (Nat. Bureau of
Econ. Rsch. Working Paper, Paper No. 26989, 2020), http://www.nber.org/papers/w26989
[https://perma.cc/CB8P-58CH].
282 See, e.g., Steinhauer & Wells, supra note 281 (noting that restaurants can often be
major tourism generators and have other spillover effects into the local economy); Flitter,
supra note 274 (noting that in light of a growing resurgence in cases and shifting guidance,
many small business owners are just giving up).
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CARES Act expanded the existing EIDL program.283 The emergency 
loans are typically available to eligible employers in declared disaster 
areas that have suffered substantial economic injury and are unable 
to access capital through other sources.284 As in the case of PPP loans, 
EIDLs limit eligible borrowers to employers with up to 500 employees, 
including sole proprietorships, cooperatives, Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans, and tribal small businesses.285 Although EIDL 
amounts are limited to $2 million under the statute,286 unconfirmed 
media reports indicate that these are reduced to $150,000 per applicant 
during the COVID-19 disaster.287 
The CARES Act also provided for an additional $10 billion in EIDL 
grants—advances on EIDLs or other loans that small businesses and 
nonprofit employers may receive in the future.288 Specifically, the 
CARES Act initially made EIDL grants of up to $10,000 available to 
small business and nonprofit employers.289 The SBA reduced this grant 
from $10,000 per employer to $1,000 per employee up to 10 
employees.290 The SBA closed the EIDL application process on April 
15—presumably because funds were exhausted and the SBA needed 
time to work through a backlog of applications—and reopened for new 
283 Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7(a) 
(1953)). 
284 13 C.F.R. § 123.300 (2020) (describing eligibility requirements). The SBA’s 
COVID-19 response follows reform efforts in recent years to improve the SBA Disaster 
Loan Program. See BRUCE LINDSEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41309, THE SBA DISASTER 
LOAN PROGRAM: OVERVIEW AND POSSIBLE ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2015), https:// 
nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R41309.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZN5 
-8B8F]. SBA Disaster Loans can be implemented through one of five ways, including
presidential disaster declaration or SBA Administrator declaration. Id. at 4.
285 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-
136, § 1110(a), 134 Stat. 318 (2020). The interest rates for these EIDL loans are capped at 
3.75% for businesses and 2.75% for nonprofits, and the loans have a maturity of up to thirty 
years. 13 C.F.R. § 123.302 (2020); see also Neil Hare, Loan Forgiveness Under the PPP 
and the SBA EIDL Programs: 10 Things Small Businesses Need to Know, FORBES (May 11, 
2020, 10:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2020/05/11/loan-forgiveness 
-ppp-sba-eidl-programs/#6f45c47f2e00 [https://perma.cc/8B8N-DX2H].
286 LINDSEY, supra note 284, at 3.
287 See Hare, supra note 285. 
288 CARES Act § 1110(e)(7). The CARES Act makes these EIDL grants that do not need 
to be repaid. Id. § 1110(e)(5). 
289 Id. § 1110(e)(3). Note that under the program, the covered period is broader than the 
PPP—it includes January 31, 2020, through December 31, 2020. Id. § 1110(a). 
290 See Hare, supra note 285. 
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applications from U.S. agricultural businesses due to additional funds 
allocated by Congress.291 
It is unclear how the SBA Disaster Loan Program, and EIDLs in 
particular, will perform during the pandemic.292 However, the initial 
rollout suggests that the program’s capacity to mitigate housing 
instability will be limited by the same factors that hindered PPP loans. 
For example, as seen in the case of PPP loans, application processing 
time may affect whether the program prevents business closures and 
layoffs.  
Even before the pandemic, processing time was a significant issue 
with SBA Disaster Loans—including the EIDL.293 Though the SBA 
has not released data on wait times for EIDL grant processing,294 one 
data set of 18,920 EIDL grant applications indicates a median wait time 
291 U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N, CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19): SBA DISASTER ASSISTANCE 
IN RESPONSE TO THE CORONAVIRUS, https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/disaster 
-assistance/coronavirus-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/8NRM-ZXSW].
292 From the available data, most SBA Disaster Loan Program loans tend to go toward
rebuilding physical structures following natural disasters. It remains unlikely that a similar
nonnatural disaster of the size and scope of COVID-19 offers a precedent for the SBA to
follow in extending capital and credit through the EIDL. Thus, as applied to low-income
and housing insecure populations, the EIDL is best viewed through a lens similar to that of
the PPP: a tool designed to allow employers to keep workers employed if possible.
293 See LINDSEY, supra note 284, at 10. The SBA’s goal in FY 2009 was to process
EIDLs within eighteen days; though the SBA has reduced the standard processing time
based upon application volume with the longest wait time at four-plus weeks for more than
500,000 applications per year. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FY 2016 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND FY 2014 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 87 (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/1-FY_2016_CBJ_FY_2014_APR_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GX4S-PCDY]. To improve disaster loan processing, Congress adopted
measures to improve coordination between the SBA and FEMA. Small Business Disaster
Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 1406. These
reforms also required the SBA to establish the Immediate Disaster Assistance Program. Pub.
L. No. 110-234, § 12084. Under this program, the SBA would provide interim “bridge
loans” of up to $25,000 within thirty-six hours of receiving a loan application. See LINDSEY,
supra note 284, at 12. As of a 2014 GAO report, the SBA had yet to pilot this new
lending program. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-760, SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE MORE TIMELY
DISASTER ASSISTANCE (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666213.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5EXU-GCKL]. The Immediate Disaster Assistance Program resembles the EIDL grants
enacted under the CARES Act.
294 See Isaac Arnsdorf, Thousands of Small Business Owners Have Not Gotten Disaster 
Loans the Government Promised Them, PROPUBLICA (July 16, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www 
.propublica.org/article/thousands-of-small-business-owners-have-not-gotten-disaster-loans 
-the-government-promised-them [https://perma.cc/MJF2-FP99] (noting that at a hearing on
July 1, 2020, before the House Committee on Small Business, Associate Administrator
James Rivera responded that while initially the average wait time for processing was forty-
one days, it had dropped to five days. But other data cited conflicts with Mr. Rivera’s
statement).
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to receive funds of seventeen days.295 This wait time is significantly 
greater than the thirty-six-hour aspirational goal enacted in recent 
congressional reform. As of April 24, 2020, the SBA reported national 
EIDLs totaled 38,984 loans approved at a total dollar amount of 
$7,967,174,888.296 
Also like the PPP loans, early evidence suggests that the EIDLs 
have not been disbursed evenhandedly. A May 8, 2020, SBA report 
indicated that 3,009,934 EIDL grants297 were made totaling 
$9,883,210,000.298 While the grants were supposed to be issued on a 
first-come, first-served basis, some reports indicate that some 
applications were “jumping the line” and being funded sooner than 
other applications despite a later application date.299 As a result, there 
is some question as to whether the EIDL program may serve some 
businesses more effectively than others due to internal policies. Thus, 
EIDL grants are unlikely to mitigate housing instability for the same 
reasons that plague PPP loans.  
C. Use of Tax Expenditures
The analysis in Part II demonstrated that tax expenditures are often 
inferior to direct grants during a crisis period. Setting aside more 
general debates comparing tax expenditure and direct grant approaches, 
an important reason to prefer grants during economic downturns is that 
many forms of tax preferences decrease in value as taxpayers’ tax 
liability declines. As a result, the reduced size of the tax-based subsidy 
may render the tax preference ineffective as an incentive to engage in 
prosocial activities. 
295 COVID LOAN TRACKER, SMALL BUSINESS LOAN TRACKER, https://www.covidloan 
tracker.com/ [https://perma.cc/6LJ5-ZN9M] (data as of May 13, 2020). 
296 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SBA DISASTER ASSISTANCE UPDATE NATIONWIDE 
ECONOMIC INJURY DISASTER LOANS COVID-19 (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.sba.gov 
/sites/default/files/2020-04/EIDL%20COVID-19%20Loans%204.24.20.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/3KZ5-GF83]. 
297 The SBA terms them EIDL Advances. 
298 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., DISASTER ASSISTANCE UPDATE EIDL ADVANCE 
 (May 8, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/EIDL%20COVID-19%20 
Advance%205.8.20_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/29GN-7FBH]. This is up from 1,192,519 EIDL 
Advances processed totaling $4,805,897,000 as reported on April 24, 2020. U.S. SMALL 
BUS. ADMIN., supra note 296. 
299 COVID Loan Tracker, COVID Loan Tracker’s Data Shows SBA Failing to Pay EIDL 
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The initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic has included several 
notable tax preferences, two of which are discussed here due to their 
particular relevance to the issue of housing instability: a refundable tax 
credit for employers and expanded tax deductions for charitable 
donations. As this section will explain, only the latter of these tax 
expenditures may decrease in value as taxpayers’ income levels 
decline. However, neither tax expenditure is designed to promote any 
specific activity that would reduce housing instability. 
1. Refundable Tax Credit for Employers
In addition to the relief to employers described in Section III.B.2,
the CARES Act provides for a refundable tax credit for employers 
that are subject to closure due to COVID-19.300 With two exceptions, 
all employers (including nonprofits)301 are eligible for this tax relief, 
regardless of size. The excepted employers are (1) state and local 
governments and entities they control and (2) small businesses that 
borrow from the SBA, including through the PPP and EIDLs.302 
Eligible employers can claim a refundable credit against their 
employment taxes for up to 50% of qualified wages for each employee 
per quarter, up to $10,000.303  
Significantly, this tax benefit is structured as a refundable credit.304 
Unlike nonrefundable tax credits, which are limited by taxpayers’ tax 
300 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-
136, § 2301(a)–(b), (b)(3), 134 Stat. 318 (2020). The CARES Act also provides for payroll 
tax deferrals until December 31, 2021, for 50% of employment taxes owed before January 
1, 2021, and the remaining employment taxes due by December 31, 2022. CARES Act 
§ 2302(d)(3). This provision amounts to an interest-free loan of 6.2% of all wages paid for
2020 after approximately March 27. Lewis Horowitz & Eric Kodesch, IRS CARES Enough
to Give PPP Loan Recipients an Interest-Free Loan from Continued Deferral of the
Employer Portion of the Social Security Tax, LANE POWELL (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www
.lanepowell.com/Our-Insights/202005/IRS-CARES-Enough-to-Give-PPP-Loan-Recipients
-an-Interest-Free-Loan-From-Continued-Deferral-of-the-Employer-Portion-of-the-Social
-Security-Tax [https://perma.cc/2AKA-ZZFY]. For employers receiving PPP loans, the
delay of employer payroll taxes is only for amounts payable before PPP loans are forgiven,
if at all. Id.
301 CARES Act § 2301(c)(2)(C). 
302 Robert W. Wood, 3 Virus-Related Tax Credits IRS Pays in Cash Long Before Tax 
Time, FORBES (May 11, 2020, 11:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2020 
/05/11/3-virus-related-tax-credits-irs-pays-in-cash-long-before-tax-time/#ae2b5b045e77 
[https://perma.cc/8C2W-GNQN]. 
303 CARES Act § 2301(a)–(b), (b)(3); IR-2020-62, IRS: Employee Retention Credit 
Available for Many Businesses Financially Impacted by COVID-19 (Nov. 9, 2020), https: 
//www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-employee-retention-credit-available-for-many-businesses 
-financially-impacted-by-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/K9SV-QMTP].
304 IR-2020-62, supra note 303.
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liability, refundable tax credits can be claimed in full even if a business 
does not have current tax liability.305 In this sense, the tax credit is 
similar to a cash grant in that its value does not depend on a taxpayer’s 
tax liability.  
As a result, the credit, paid in cash, can be a windfall for many 
businesses. However, this refundability feature does not increase the 
likelihood that this intervention will mitigate housing instability. This 
is because the tax credit is broadly available to all eligible employers 
and does not create an incentive for any particular behavior. Whether 
employers decide to use the cash from the credit to keep workers and 
those who are housing insecure employed—thereby helping to mitigate 
housing instability—remains to be seen. 
2. Expanded Tax Deduction for Charitable Donations
The CARES Act also includes indirect support for nonprofits
through an expanded tax deduction for donors.306 Specifically, the law 
provides a deduction of up to $300, if made in cash, for charitable 
contributions made by those who do not itemize their deductions.307 
This provision is permanent and in effect for taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 2019.308 For taxpayers who itemize their 
deductions, the limitation on charitable contribution deductions is 
increased.309 The increase in the cap applies to contributions made in 
cash during the 2020 calendar year only.310 The stated purpose of these 
provisions is to encourage taxpayers—including those who do not 
305 Unlike nonrefundable tax credits, which provide a dollar-for-dollar offset to taxes 
owed until the taxpayer’s tax liability is reduced to zero, refundable tax credits are not 
limited by a taxpayer’s tax liability. In other words, even a taxpayer that owes no taxes is 
entitled to the full credit amount delivered to the taxpayer as a cash “refund.” 
306 See generally Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The 
Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010). 
307 CARES Act § 2204(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 62(a)(22)), (b) (codified at I.R.C. § 62(f) 
(1), (2)(A), (2)(B)). 
308 CARES Act § 2204(c). 
309 Id. § 2205 (a), (c). 
310 Id. § 2205(a)(3)(i). For individuals, the 50% AGI limitation in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) 
is increased to 100% of AGI. Id. § 2205(a)(2)(A)(i); I.R.C. § 170(b)(1). For corporations 
the limitation goes from the 10% taxable income limitation in I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A) to 25% 
of taxable income. CARES Act § 2205(a)(2)(B)(i); I.R.C. § 170(b)(2). For both individuals 
and corporations, any excess deductions over the limitation amount may be carried over to 
future years. CARES Act § 2205(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(B)(ii). The law also increases the limits 
on contribution of food inventory from trades or businesses during 2020 from 15% of trade 
or business income to 25% of trade or business income. Id. § 2205(b).  
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itemize—to donate “to churches and charitable organizations in 
2020.”311 
However, unlike the refundable tax credit available to employers, 
the value of these charitable deductions may decrease as taxpayers’ 
income levels decline. This is because the value of a deduction is tied 
to a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, which may fall if income decreases 
due to unemployment. As a result, the deduction may no longer provide 
a sufficient incentive to donate.  
That said, even if the deduction provides sufficient incentive to 
donate, it is still unlikely to help mitigate housing instability. This is 
because the deduction is not well targeted to charities that will meet the 
needs of people who are low income or housing insecure.312 In theory, 
increasing donations to nonprofits may help subsidize expansion of 
homeless shelters or emergency affordable housing. But the deduction 
is intentionally broad, and donors can just as easily choose to donate to 
well-resourced private universities, for example, instead of community 
health clinics or other service organizations that serve the poor or 
homeless.313 For this reason, it is unlikely that the deduction will 
effectively mitigate housing instability. 
D. Omission of Place-Based Interventions
As discussed in Section II.D.3 above, there is likely to be a continued 
need for place-based investment in neighborhoods during and after 
a crisis period. However, the initial legislative response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic did not include any interventions to sustain 
affordable housing development or economic development in low-
income communities. This omission may have significant long-term 
consequences for housing instability. 
Thus, this part has demonstrated that the initial interventions during 
the COVID-19 pandemic are unlikely to effectively mitigate housing 
311 See Section-by-Section Summary of Appropriations in the CARES Act, 
NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/section_by_section 
_summary_of_appropriations_in_the_cares_act_032520.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BQ-7SMZ] 
[hereinafter Section-by-Section Summary]. 
312 Id. 
313 Meanwhile, the charitable donation deduction may serve to undermine progressivity 
in the tax system by providing greater value to those with higher incomes than those with 
lower incomes. Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO  
L. REV. 1, 70 (1996); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705, 723 (1970).
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instability. The next part will provide an alternate vision of legislation 
that prioritizes mitigating housing instability.  
IV 
PRIORITIES FOR MITIGATING HOUSING INSTABILITY 
A. Prioritizing Housing
A complete and successful policy response to COVID-19 must 
mitigate housing instability. This is a vital public health imperative. 
This part draws on the foregoing analysis to identify two broad 
priorities for effective mitigation of housing instability. In doing so, 
this analysis not only provides a baseline for evaluating subsequent 
legislation during the COVID-19 pandemic but it also serves as a set of 
recommendations for early policy responses to future crises. 
The first priority is to include people-based interventions that 
provide relief directly to individuals who are unable to pay their 
rents or mortgages. These interventions should include direct housing 
assistance, as well as a civil right to counsel in eviction proceedings 
to help enforce eviction freezes. Such interventions are essential to 
mitigate housing instability during the crisis period. The second 
priority is to include place-based interventions that address ongoing 
affordable housing needs and mitigate geographic inequities 
exacerbated by the crisis. These interventions are necessary to mitigate 
housing instability in the months and years following the crisis. To this 
end, Part IV recommends direct people-based interventions and place-
based interventions that are consistent with these principles. 
B. Direct People-Based Interventions
We recommend that people-based interventions that provide relief 
directly to individuals facing housing instability should be a top 
legislative priority during a pandemic. This section draws on the 
foregoing analysis to identify two types of relief that should be 
included. The first—direct housing payment assistance—is necessary 
even when indirect assistance (like unemployment insurance) or 
nonmonetary direct interventions (like eviction freezes and foreclosure 
moratoriums) are available.  
The second form of emergency relief is the implementation 
of effective and enforceable eviction freezes and foreclosure 
moratoriums. Advocates have devoted significant attention to the need 
to strengthen eviction freezes, specifically the need to cover larger 
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populations of tenants and provide greater protection.314 Such reforms 
could greatly increase the efficacy of such interventions to mitigate 
housing instability. However, problems with enforcement would 
remain. For this reason, this section recommends the creation of a civil 
right to counsel to help ensure that foreclosure moratoriums and 
eviction freezes are enforced. This section will elaborate upon both 
recommendations, beginning with housing payment assistance. 
1. Housing Payment Assistance
This Article recommends both preventative policies that keep
owners and renters in their homes and programs that provide a 
housing safety net to facilitate rapid rehousing of people who lose their 
homes due to foreclosure or eviction. Most importantly, the federal 
policy response must include housing-specific monetary assistance for 
renters or homeowners, such as rental vouchers and reinstatement 
of the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing program 
that successfully ran from 2009 to 2012.315 HPRR could provide direct 
aid to struggling tenants and homeowners including financial 
assistance, housing relocation, and stabilization services.316 Struggling 
homeowners should also be assisted by providing direct assistance with 
mortgage payments, property taxes, property insurance, utilities, and 
other housing-related costs.317  
We recommend that lawmakers leverage existing tools, such as the 
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program to take advantage of 
established administrative frameworks that can help minimize 
problems and delays during the program rollout.318 We believe that 
314 See, e.g., Eviction Lab, COVID-19 Housing Policy Scorecard, https://evictionlab.org 
/covid-policy-scorecard/ [https://perma.cc/H4XT-GBQ2]; Sacha Pfeiffer, Health Justice 
Lawyer Argues for Nationwide Eviction Moratorium, NPR (July 5, 2020, 5:20 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/05/887465412/health-justice-lawyer-argues-for-nationwide 
-eviction-moratorium [https://perma.cc/8X9U-CC2Q].
315 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 2, 123 Stat.
115, 203.
316 This assistance could include short- and medium-term rental assistance, security and
utility deposits, utility payments, moving cost assistance, motel and hotel vouchers case
management, outreach, housing search and placement, legal services, and credit repair.
DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION AND RAPID RE-HOUSING 
PROGRAM (HPRP): YEAR 3 & FINAL PROGRAM SUMMARY 28 (June 2016), https://
files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/HPRP-Year-3-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc
/FUY2-UQVC].
317 Please see the Postscript for a brief analysis of subsequent legislation that provided
assistance to renters.
318 For one such proposal put forth by housing policy experts, see Kirk McClure & Alex
Schwartz, Renters Still Left Out in the Cold Despite Temporary Coronavirus Protection,
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such targeted interventions to prevent homelessness through tenant and 
homeowner assistance will be more effective than place-based 
strategies or indirect assistance programs to mitigate housing instability 
during a crisis. 
2. Civil Right to Counsel in Evictions Proceedings
Eviction freezes and foreclosure moratoriums will likely continue to
play a significant role in mitigating housing instability, so it is essential 
that lawmakers take steps to ensure such laws are enforced. Because 
low-income tenants are particularly vulnerable to enforcement failures, 
this Article recommends a program to provide a civil right to counsel 
in eviction proceedings during these extreme circumstances.319 Recall 
that while many states have implemented eviction moratoriums to 
prevent a wave of evictions,320 housing advocates nevertheless report 
a flood of wrongful eviction cases nationwide.321 Housing instability 
will likely increase as unemployment rates continue to rise and 
foreclosure moratoriums and eviction freezes expire.322 This will lead 
to a surge of eviction cases.323 Unfortunately, eviction leads directly 
and indirectly to housing instability and homelessness.324  
Low-income tenants are in the greatest jeopardy and can often be 
helped with modest resources. Most tenants in New York City 
threatened by eviction owe less than $600.325 Studies show that a 
homeless individual can cost taxpayers over $35,000 in programs and 
services, including increased costs to the public health care system and 
CONVERSATION (Apr. 23, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://theconversation.com/renters-still-left 
-out-in-the-cold-despite-temporary-coronavirus-protection-136550 [https://perma.cc/LKR2
-ZL75].
319 For an in-depth discussion of a civil litigation right to counsel, see John Pollock
& Michael S. Greco, It’s Not Triage if the Patient Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 40 (2012) (arguing for a civil right to counsel mirroring Gideon-style right to
counsel in criminal matters).
320 See infra Appendix A. 
321 See supra notes 16–17. 
322 See supra Section III.A. 
323  Please see the Postscript for a brief analysis of subsequent legislation that provided 
rent payment assistance to tenants. 
324 NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, PROTECT TENANTS, PREVENT 
HOMELESSNESS (2018), https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ProtectTenants2018 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9NW-ZHNC] [hereinafter NLCHP]. 
325 Emily Badger, Many Renters Who Face Eviction Owe Less than $600, N.Y.  
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/12/upshot/eviction-prevention 
-solutions-government.html [https://perma.cc/W32Q-DW9X].
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the cost of emergency housing.326 Studies also show that right to 
counsel initiatives save huge amounts of resources by preventing the 
use of homeless services and programs simply by keeping people in 
their homes.327 A cost-benefit analysis in New York City showed that 
a right to counsel program would reduce evictions by 77% and save 
$320 million each year.328 Keeping people in their homes is also an 
important public health goal during this pandemic. A civil right to 
counsel in eviction proceedings program will help achieve this goal. 
Landlords are almost always represented by attorneys in court, while 
most tenants are not represented.329 Many tenants have meritorious 
cases but are unable to prove such without assistance.330 In Chicago, 
having an attorney decreased tenants’ “odds of getting an eviction order 
by about 25%.”331 In an evaluation of a legal assistance program for 
low-income tenants in New York City’s housing court, the results 
demonstrated that having legal counsel produced large differences in 
outcomes for the low-income tenants.332 “For example, only 22% of 
represented tenants had final judgments against them, compared with 
326 NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS, ENDING CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS SAVES 
TAXPAYERS MONEY (2017), http://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cost 
-Savings-from-PSH.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL5D-W97B].
327 STOUT RISIUS ROSS, INC., PRO BONO & LEGAL SERVS. COMM. OF THE N.Y.C. BAR
ASS’N, THE FINANCIAL COST AND BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
EVICTION PROCEEDINGS UNDER INTRO 214-A (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www2.nycbar.org
/pdf/report/uploads/SRR_Report_Financial_Cost_and_Benefits_of_Establishing_a_Right
_to_Counsel_in_Eviction_Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/87XQ-TSGT].
328 NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 324. 
329 This representation imbalance between tenants and landlords likely explains courts’ 
historic “award[ing] of relatively little compensation for . . . violations” of the warranty of 
habitability. Kathryn A. Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27 GEO. J 
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 97, 136 (2019). “We can only imagine how the law and court 
culture might look if both parties had enjoyed decades of equality of representation.” Id.  
330 Id. Professor Franzese has demonstrated that a tenant’s assertion of the defense of 
the implied warranty of habitability works but requires effective assistance of counsel as 
tenants are often unaware of their basic rights. Paula A. Franzese et al., The Implied 
Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 
69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2016).  
331 LAW. COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., OPENING THE DOOR ON CHICAGO EVICTIONS: 
LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS MAKE THE DIFFERENCE (May 2019), https://eviction.lcbh.org 
/sites/default/files/reports/chicago-evictions-3-attorney-represenation.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/7975-28YZ]. 
332 See generally Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for 
Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001), https://www.rtctoolkit.org/docs/7/Impact%20of%20Counsel 
%20on%20Tenants%20(Seron%20NY%20study).pdf [https://perma.cc/62XC-PDFB]. 
“Similarly large advantages for tenants with an attorney also were found in eviction orders 
and stipulations requiring the landlord to provide rent abatements or repairs.” Id. 
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51% of tenants without legal representation.”333 Harvard researchers 
have also empirically shown that Massachusetts case outcomes are 
materially improved for tenants when they have access to full legal 
representation.334 
Currently, New York City, San Francisco, and Newark, New Jersey, 
have right to counsel programs for tenants in eviction.335 Various pilot 
programs336 have demonstrated that a targeted approach for serving 
low-income housing court litigants in danger of homelessness with 
legal, financial, and social service interventions can keep them from 
homelessness.337 In New York City, when housing court eviction cases 
were “resolved by OCJ’s legal services providers, 84% of households 
represented in court by lawyers were able to remain in their homes, not 
only saving thousands of tenancies, but also promoting the preservation 
of affordable housing and neighborhood stability.”338  
333 Id. 
334 “[A]t least in part because ‘the inability of some self-represented litigants to 
understand and comply with court rules and procedures may make it impossible for 
their cases, however worthy, to be decided on the merits.’” BOS. BAR ASS’N, INVESTING  
IN JUSTICE: A ROADMAP TO COST-EFFECTIVE FUNDING OF CIVIL LEGAL AID IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 18 (Oct. 2014), https://bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-library 
/statewide-task-force-to-expand-civil-legal-aid-in-ma---investing-in-justice.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/V8GV-5UJL].  
335 Heidi Schultheis & Caitlin Rooney, A Right to Counsel Is a Right to a Fighting 
Chance: The Importance of Legal Representation in Eviction Proceedings, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty 
/reports/2019/10/02/475263/right-counsel-right-fighting-chance/ [https://perma.cc/YV2N 
-E3M6]. Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. have right to counsel in eviction
programs. Status Map, NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., http://civilrighttocounsel
.org/map [https://perma.cc/4NKA-9LKF].
336 Since September 2007, a “Task Force on the Civil Right to Counsel (‘Task Force’) 
convened by the Boston Bar Association” has focused on how to establish a right to counsel 
for households at risk of losing their homes. It recommended pilot projects to explore 
mechanisms for providing counsel and the ramifications of creating a right to counsel 
including the costs as well as the cost savings to Massachusetts. “Funding was obtained for 
two pilot projects involving eviction cases.” BOS. BAR ASS’N, THE IMPORTANCE OF 
REPRESENTATIONS IN EVICTION CASES AND HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION (Mar. 2012), 
https://bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-library/bba-crtc-final-3-1-12.pdf/ [https://perma 
.cc/WAP9-W9ZG]. 
337 For example, in 2005, the United Way of NYC, in partnership with the NYC Civil 
Court and the NYC Department of Homeless Services, launched the Housing Help Program, 
a three-year pilot program to address the challenges facing families struggling to avoid 
eviction and homelessness. SEEDCO, HOUSING HELP PROGRAM: HOMELESSNESS 
PREVENTION PILOT FINAL REPORT (June 2010), https://www.rtctoolkit.org/docs/7/NYC 
%20Housing%20Help%20Program%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYD2-ALVD]. 
338 N.Y.C. OFF. OF CIV. JUST., UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: A REPORT  
ON YEAR TWO OF IMPLEMENTATION IN NEW YORK CITY (2019), https://www1.nyc.gov 
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Many reports have concluded that the monetary benefits of 
representing eligible beneficiaries in eviction and foreclosure 
proceedings far outweigh the costs of providing these services.339 
Thus, to further stave off homelessness once the eviction and 
foreclosure forbearance measures have expired, we recommend a five-
year Right to Counsel Program of civil legal aid in eviction and 
foreclosure cases. The Right to Counsel Program would be funded 
through competitively granting awards to governmental entities to help 
ensure low-income tenants and homeowners actually obtain housing 
benefits to which they are entitled and to assist them in housing courts 
when faced with losing their apartments or homes.340 The award 
recipients’ programs should focus on making full legal representation 
available to low-income homeowners facing foreclosure or low-
income tenants facing eviction in housing court and in public housing 
authority termination of tenancy proceedings.341 
C. Grant-Funded Place-Based Interventions
The second priority is to include place-based interventions that 
mitigate housing instability in the months and years after the crisis 
period. As explained in Section II.D above, the pandemic will likely 
create a need for additional interventions to increase the supply of 
affordable housing and to address problems associated with vacant 
properties. To ensure that the benefits of these interventions flow to 
neighborhood residents instead of investors, the law should prioritize 




339 For example, the Analysis Group “estimates that the total annual cost to represent all 
eligible beneficiaries in Massachusetts is $28.48 million, while the annual savings from 
representing this population is $76.52 million.” BOS. BAR ASS’N, supra note 334, at 20. 
340 Professor Sabbeth notes that the “[z]ealous use of counterclaims can increase a 
defendant’s leverage in negotiation and potentially improve a poor tenant’s bargaining 
power both inside and outside the courtroom. Counterclaims can also deter initiation of 
future litigation.” Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 55, 113 (2018).  
341 Proposals should target those below 200% of the federal poverty level. U.S. Senator 
Merkley’s bill and U.S. Representative Clyburn’s bill would distribute the funds through 
the Secretary of HUD, whereas U.S. Representative DeLauro’s bill would authorize the 
Attorney General to make the grants to States and localities. Affordable HOME Act, S. 3452 
§ 108, 116th Cong. (2020); Legal Assistance to Prevent Evictions Act of 2020, H.R. 5884,
116th Cong. (2020); Eviction Prevention Act of 2019, H.R. 5298, 116th Cong. (2019).
342 Layser, supra note 148, at 55–59. 
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During the Great Recession, a significant barrier to advancing these 
objectives was the lack of resources. The Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit program struggled to provide adequate incentives during a 
recession period, and the Neighborhood Stabilization Program received 
only modest funding.343 The Tax Credit Assistance Program and Tax 
Credit Exchange Program helped sustain LIHTC investment during 
that period, and lawmakers should consider reinstating those grant 
programs during subsequent crises like the COVID-19 pandemic. 
It may also be possible to tap into the large pool of capital created 
by the Opportunity Zone legislation to increase the supply of affordable 
housing. However, for this place-based tool to help distressed 
communities, there must be an affirmative effort for investments to 
reflect the affordable housing needs of the residents within these 
designated opportunity zones.344 Ideally, place-based tax incentives 
would incorporate procedures for screening projects and approval 
would be required by an administering agency with expertise in the 
development of low-income communities.345 For this reason, we 
propose a program of competitively awarded grants to certified 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) and qualified 
nonprofit housing organizations that partner with qualified opportunity 
funds to develop affordable housing. Certified CDFIs are community 
lenders that often provide funding for affordable housing 
developments.346  
The U.S. Treasury Department’s Community Development 
Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund)347 would allocate these grants 
343 See supra text accompanying notes 109–10 (describing struggles of LIHTC program) 
and text accompanying notes 114–16 (describing NSP funding). 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 109–10 (describing struggles of LIHTC program) 
and text accompanying notes 114–16 (describing NSP funding). 
345 Layser, supra note 148, at 39–40. 
346 Certification is given by the CDFI Fund for “specialized financial institutions serving 
low-income communities.” U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY: CDFI FUND, CDFI CERTIFICATION: 
YOUR GATEWAY TO THE CDFI COMMUNITY (2016), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents 
/CDFI_PROGRAM_FACT_SHEET_CERTIFICATION_updatedJAN2016.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/V9CP-JKPL]. In a report released in June 2020, the Urban Institute also 
recommends, inter alia, that “reforms should be made to support CDFIs, which have a long 
track record of making substantial investments in low-income communities.” Theodos et al., 
supra note 131, at 35. The Urban Institute recommends redesigning the OZ incentive to 
“encourage equity investments in CDFIs who set up QOFs.” Id. at 36.  
347 “The CDFI Fund was created for the purpose of promoting economic revitalization 
and community development through investment in and assistance to Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs). The CDFI Fund was established by the Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, as a bipartisan 
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through a competitive application process to certified CDFIs or 
qualified nonprofits with an affordable housing mission that are able to 
partner with a QOF on an affordable housing project.348 The goal of 
partnering a QOF with a certified CDFI or qualified nonprofit would 
be to steer the approximately $10 billion of QOF equity into sorely 
needed affordable housing projects in opportunity zones in lieu of the 
hotel and luxury apartment projects that have tainted the Opportunity 
Zone tool’s reputation. Direct grants to nonprofits are preferable to the 
nontargeted deductions included in the CARES Act.349 By providing 
grants directly to nonprofits that will perform targeted activities—such 
as providing affordable housing or creating homeless shelters—the 
government can increase the likelihood that expenditures will support 
activities that are most necessary during the pandemic. 
To implement this incentive, the IRS, CDFI Fund, and HUD would 
need to work together to coordinate the distribution and oversight of 
additional funds. All agencies need to have employees high enough on 
the chain communicate with each other and incentivize subordinates to 
coordinate.350 Furthermore, line employees in each agency need to 
work together to analyze and manage the program and its outcomes.351 
However, it should be noted that these agencies are already called upon 
to coordinate the administration of tax incentives for affordable 
housing and community development, such as the New Markets Tax 
Credit. By taking advantage of established cross-agency administrative 
structures, lawmakers can minimize the administrative burdens 
associated with the new grant. 
initiative.” About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY: CDFI FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov 
/about/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/J8D5-HHGV].  
348 This program would be structured very similarly to the CDFI Fund’s Capital Magnet 
Fund that competitively “award[s] grants to finance affordable housing” programs in 
low-income communities nationwide. Capital Magnet Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY:  
CDFI FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Programs/cmf/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/FJ9K-JJUG]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY: CDFI FUND, CAPITAL 
MAGNET FUND: SOLUTIONS FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 
(2020), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/CMF%20Fact%20Sheet%20Feb2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S8KP-VKPW]. 
349 See supra Section III.C. 
350 See Saito, supra note 102, at 496–97. Note that having an office in charge of 
interagency coordination in the IRS could aid in coordinating with HUD to manage LIHTC 
and that in the implementation of the ACA, a dedicated office seemingly aided in the 
implementation of key provisions. 
351 See id. at 494–95 (noting the importance of having joint teams of line-level 
employees administer the program). 
2021] Mitigating Housing Instability During a Pandemic 515
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have set forth two significant priorities: (1) direct 
mitigation of housing instability during the pandemic and (2) place-
based interventions to mitigate housing instability and geographic 
inequality in the months and years that follow. These housing security 
objectives have been underemphasized despite their importance to a 
full policy response to controlling the health crisis and managing the 
economic fallout of the pandemic. We recommend that legislators take 
steps to provide direct rental assistance for tenants and mortgage 
payment assistance for homeowners, a new civil right to counsel in 
evictions, and specific place-based interventions to promote affordable 
housing development. Interventions like these, which are designed to 
mitigate housing instability, are not only essential to address the 
continuing threat from COVID-19 but also to prepare the United States 
for future pandemics. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into law on December 
27, 2020, included more than $900 billion in COVID-19-related 
relief.352 In addition to extending CARES Act unemployment 
assistance,353 the bill included several emergency provisions and 
appropriations that addressed housing instability. These provisions 
included extended federal eviction freezes and foreclosure 
moratoriums, housing assistance payments to be distributed by state 
and local governments, increased funding for the federal Housing 
Choice Vouchers program, and increased funding for affordable 
housing and community development.354 Overall, these initiatives 
improve upon the mitigation efforts included in the CARES Act by 
targeting assistance directly to housing programs. However, the 
amount of funding continues to fall short of the estimated need, and 
many tenants will remain vulnerable to eviction (legal and illegal) in 
the coming months. 
Specifically, the law extended the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention eviction moratorium through January 31, 2021,355 and it 
352 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020). 
353 Id. § 201. 
354 Id.  
355 Id. § 502. Furthermore, the CDC has authorized an extension of the eviction 
moratorium through March 31, 2021. Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent 
the Further Spread of COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 8020 (Feb. 3, 2021). 
516 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 445 
allocated $25 billion in state grants for emergency rental assistance.356 
Unlike the state grants included in the CARES Act, these grants target 
rental assistance (not homeowner assistance) to renter households 
experiencing COVID-19-related housing instability who are below 
80% of area median income.357 Specifically, 90% of the funds must be 
used to provide financial assistance for rent, rental arrears, utilities and 
home energy costs and arrears, and other rental expenses.358 State and 
local governments must prioritize renter households experiencing 
unemployment for more than ninety days and whose income is at or 
below 50% of area median income.359  
This $25 billion in rental assistance is helpful, but it is insufficient 
to meet current needs. The National Low-Income Housing Coalition 
estimates that nearly $100 billion in direct rental assistance is 
required.360 Moreover, the Act limits emergency housing assistance to 
three months of rent,361 which may leave tenants at risk of eviction if 
the pandemic continues to disrupt employment. The Act also prohibits 
states from assisting applicants with prospective rental payments until 
they have helped reduce the household’s rental arrears.362 Because 
many tenants are currently in arrears due to a paucity of housing 
assistance under the CARES Act, this limitation implies that much 
of the new emergency assistance will be used to assist with rental 
obligations that accrued in 2020, and it may fail to cover new 
obligations that arise in 2021.  
In addition to the emergency rental assistance, the Act included a 
$25.8 billion appropriation for the federal tenant-based rental 
assistance program (Housing Choice Vouchers),363 which expanded 
the program by $1.9 billion above the 2020 enacted level.364 Of that 
356 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, § 501. 
357 Id. § 501. 
358 Id. § 501(c)(2). 
359 Id. § 501(c)(2)–(4). 
360 ANDREW AURAND, DAN EMMANUEL & DANIEL THREET, NLIHC RESEARCH  
NOTE: THE NEED FOR EMERGENCY RENTAL ASSISTANCE DURING THE COVID-19 AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 2 (2020), https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Need-for-Rental-Assistance 
-During-the-COVID-19-and-Economic-Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9YJ-LMJ3].
361 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, § 501(c)(2)(B).
362 Id. § 501(c)(2)(B). 
363 Id. div. L, tit. II (Department of Housing and Urban Development—Public and Indian 
Housing—Tenant-Based Rental Assistance). 
364 HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMM., 116TH CONG., H.R. 133: DIVISION-BY-DIVISION 
SUMMARY OF APPROPRIATIONS PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2021), https://appropriations 
.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Summary%20of%20H.R.%20133 
%20Appropriations%20Provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU5L-55GY]. 
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amount, $43.4 million must be used to assist individuals and families 
who are homeless.365 While these programs are essential parts of 
federal housing policy, the increase over nonemergency levels is 
relatively small, and the portion devoted to homelessness and 
rehousing is particularly low given the scale of the anticipated eviction 
crisis. The Consolidated Appropriations Act also includes $20 million 
in competitive grants for free legal assistance to low-income tenants 
facing eviction, but this remains insufficient given the enormity of the 
problem.366  
Beyond assistance for individuals, the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act also included place-based initiatives aimed at supporting 
investment in affordable housing and neighborhoods 
disproportionately affected by COVID-19. The Act included a $7.8 
billion appropriation to the federal Public Housing Fund,367 which was 
$387 million above the 2020 enacted level.368 It established a new floor 
for the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program used for 
rehabilitation of affordable housing or paired with other federal 
subsidies.369 The LIHTC expansion is intended to promote private 
investment in affordable housing.370 Finally, the legislation included 
$3 billion in funding to assist Community Development Financial 
Institutions that invest in neighborhoods disproportionately affected 
by the pandemic,371 and it extended the New Markets Tax Credit 
program through 2025.372 These programs may help address long-term 
affordable housing needs and the uneven geographic impact of the 
365 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, § 8 (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development—Public and Indian Housing—Tenant-Based Rental Assistance). 
366 Id. div. L, tit II (Department of Housing and Urban Development—Housing 
Counseling Assistance). 
367 Id. div. L, tit. II (Department of Housing and Urban Development—Public and Indian 
Housing—Public Housing Fund). 
368 HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMM., 116TH CONG., H.R. 133: DIVISION-BY-DIVISION 
SUMMARY OF APPROPRIATIONS PROVISIONS (Comm. Print 2021), https://appropriations 
.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/files/Summary%20of%20H.R.%20133 
%20Appropriations%20Provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU5L-55GY]. 
369 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, § 201 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 42(b) to 
provide that the applicable percentage shall not be less than 4% for 4% tax credit projects, 
which will increase the amount of tax credit equity that can be raised for such projects). 
370 Memorandum from Nat’l Hous. L. Project, to Hous. Just. Network Advocs. 
(Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/NHLP-Relief-Package-Approps 
-Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JAH-BGB8] (claiming that the “4% floor should
incentivize investment in 4% tax credit projects and thus advance subsidized housing
preservation efforts and expand the supply of other LIHTC units”).
371 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, § 523. 
372 Id. § 112. 
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pandemic, but it is likely that the number of impacted families far 
exceeds the relatively modest size of these programs. 
In March 2021, Congress enacted and President Biden signed the 
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, which includes $40 billion in 
essential housing and homelessness assistance, including at least $27.4 
billion for rental assistance and $5 billion to assist people who are 
homeless.373 This is another important step toward mitigating housing 
instability during the pandemic, but there remains much more to be 
done. 
373 COVID Relief Bill, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., https://nlihc.org/coronavirus 
-and-housing-homelessness/covid-package-and-housing-provisions [https://perma.cc/H43D
-HW73].
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APPENDIX A 
STATE-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS374 
374 Note that the form of these interventions varies across jurisdictions, with some 
offering stronger protections than others. Eviction Lab, supra note 198. For a detailed 
list of state law resources describing these interventions, please see Ill. Coll. of L. Libr., 
State Housing Relief Guide, https://libguides.law.illinois.edu/ld.php?content_id=54944160 
[https://perma.cc/8VYD-BTB2].  
375 Governor Doug Ducey instituted an agreement with banks to suspend evictions and 
foreclosures for 60 days. 
376 Court order has suspended nonessential matters resulting in a de facto moratorium 
on evictions, judicial foreclosures, and post-foreclosure evictions. This would not prohibit 
foreclosure sales. There are no other state mandates regarding evictions and foreclosures. 
377 Court order has limited in-person court proceedings likely resulting in a de facto 
moratorium on evictions, judicial foreclosures, and post-foreclosure evictions. This would 
not prohibit foreclosure sales. There are no other state mandates regarding evictions and 
foreclosures. 
378 Court order has postponed civil court proceedings likely resulting in a de facto 
moratorium on evictions, judicial foreclosures, and post-foreclosure evictions. This would 






























































Alabama • • • 
Alaska • • • 
Arizona375 • • • 
Arkansas • • • 
California • • • 
Colorado • • • 







Florida • • 
 
Georgia376 
Hawaii377 • • • 
Idaho378 • • 
 
Illinois • • • 
Indiana • • •
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379 Executive Order suspending legal deadlines applicable to all legal proceedings. This 
would impact eviction and some foreclosure proceedings. There are no other state mandates 
regarding evictions and foreclosures.  
380 Court order suspending in-person proceedings likely resulting in a de facto 
moratorium on evictions, judicial foreclosures, and post-foreclosure evictions. This would 






























































Iowa • • • 
Kansas • • • 
Kentucky • • • 
Louisiana379 • • • 
Maine • • • • 
Maryland • • 
 
• 
Massachusetts • • • • 
Michigan • • • • 
Minnesota 
 
• • • 
 
Mississippi • • 
Missouri380 • • 
 
Montana • • • 
Nebraska • 
  
Nevada • • 
New Hampshire • • • 






New York • • • • 
North Carolina 
 
• • • 
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381 Court ordered closure of all courts, suspension of trials, and extensions of deadlines 
likely resulting in a de facto moratorium on evictions, judicial foreclosures, and post-
foreclosure evictions. This would not prohibit foreclosure sales. There are no other state 
mandates regarding evictions and foreclosures. 
382 Court order suspending in-person proceedings. Courts are prohibited from taking an 
action to effectuate an eviction, ejectment, or other displacement from a resident based on 
failure to pay rent or loan. This results in a de facto moratorium on evictions, judicial 
foreclosures, and post-foreclosure evictions. This would not prohibit foreclosure sales. 
There are no other state mandates regarding evictions and foreclosures. 
383 Court order suspending eviction trials, hearings, and other proceedings. This would 
impact judicial foreclosure proceedings and post-foreclosure evictions. Does not prohibit 
foreclosure sales.  
384 Court order suspending nonemergency and nonessential court cases. This included 
new eviction cases and would also limit judicial foreclosure. There are no other state 
mandates regarding evictions and foreclosures. 
385 Court order postponing all proceedings and court deadlines likely resulting in a de 
facto moratorium on evictions, judicial foreclosures, and post-foreclosure evictions. This 
would not prohibit foreclosure sales. There are no other state mandates regarding evictions 
and foreclosures. 
386 Court order suspending all in-person proceedings resulting in de facto moratorium 
on evictions, judicial foreclosures, and post-foreclosure evictions. This would not prohibit 

































































Pennsylvania • • • 
Rhode Island • 
 
• 
South Carolina • • • 
South Dakota 
   
Tennessee382 • • • 





Vermont • • 
 
• 





West Virginia385 • • 
Wisconsin • • • 
Wyoming386 • • 
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